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REVERSE AGE DISCRIMINATION SUITS
AND THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT
TRACEY A. CULLEN*
"The question of the proper treatment of early-retirement

programs is the most difficult question under the Age
Discriminationin Employment Act."l
INTRODUCTION

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")2
prohibits covered employers 3 from discriminating against their
employees on the basis of age. 4 Plaintiffs in age discrimination
* J.D. Candidate, St. John's University School of Law, June 2004; B.A. History/Sociology,
cum laude, Boston College, May 2001. The author wishes to thank her parents for their
steadfast support.
1 Karlen v. City Colls. of Chi., 837 F.2d 314, 317 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1044 (1988). In Karlen, college professors sued under the ADEA, arguing that an early
retirement program adopted as part of a collective bargaining agreement discriminated
against persons over the age of 65. The court found that the early retirement incentive
program was not bona fide and the ADEA does not provide a cause of action for "reverse
discrimination." Further cases have explained the analysis for determining the proper
treatment of early retirement. See, e.g. Henn v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824, 826
(7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964 (1987).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et. seq. (2002).
3 See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2002) (defining "employer" as "a person engaged in industry
affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees"); see also Deal v. State Farm
County Mut. Ins. Co. of Tex., 5 F.3d 117, 118 (5th Cir. 1993) (describing analysis for
determining when a defendant is an employer under the ADEA); H. Lane Dennard, Jr. &
Kendall L. Kelly, Price Waterhouse: Alive and Well Under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 51 MERCER L. REV. 721, 724 (2000) (noting ADEA applies to private
sector employers with at least twenty employees, as well as labor unions, employment
agencies and federal government).
4 The ultimate question under the ADEA is whether an employer discriminated
against an employee on account of the age of the employee. See Gallo v. Prudential
Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994). Although not relevant to the
discussion at hand, the standard to be used in employment discrimination cases was set
forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
This standard has been widely followed and further explained by the circuit courts. See
Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1981); Byrne v. CNA Ins.
Cos., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12975, at *9-10 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2001); Machakos v.
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actions generally claim that their employer discriminated against
them by giving younger employees preferential treatment in the
workplace. 5 However, younger employees occasionally bring suits
under the ADEA, claiming that their employer treated older
employees better. 6 These claims of "reverse discrimination" are
brought by persons within the protected class 7 claiming their
employer discriminated against them on the basis of their age, as
8
the employer gave preference to older persons within the class.
Federal courts have generally found that the ADEA does not
discrimination, 9 or
of reverse
recognize these claims
Meese, 647 F.Supp. 1253, 1264 (Dist. D.C. 1986), affd, Machakos v. Attorney Gen. of U.S.,
273 U.S. App. D.C. 340 (1988). If plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, a
rebuttable presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden shifts to the defendant to
articulate legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its actions. McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 802. If defendant is successful, then the burden returns to the plaintiff to prove
that his employer's actions were motivated by a discriminatory intent and the reasons
claimed legitimate are actually pretextual, or unworthy of belief. Id. at 804. Therefore, a
plaintiff must overcome defendant's asserted facially nondiscriminatory reason for
terminating employment. See Reynolds v. Tele-Communications, Inc., 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2802, at *5 (10th Cir. Feb. 22, 1996).
5 See, e.g., Forman v. Small, 271 F.3d 285, 291 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (reviewing plaintiffs
contention that he presented evidence reflecting preferential treatment of younger
employees), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2661 (2002); Buchanan v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 12416, at *8 (10th Cir. May 29, 1997) (discussing plaintiffs
allegations that certain younger co-workers received preferential treatment); Mills v.
First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Belvidere, 83 F.3d 833, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) (considering
claim that younger employees received preferential treatment in both disciplinary
matters and transfers); see also Uffelman v. Lone Star Steel Co., 863 F.2d 404, 407 (5th
Cir. 1989) (explaining that plaintiff may satisfy one of the threshold burdens under ADEA
by proving that younger employees were more favorably treated), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1098 (1989).
6 See, e.g., Edwards v. Bd. of Regents, 2 F.3d 382, 383 (11th Cir. 1993) (evaluating
claim that an older employee, nearer to retirement than plaintiff, received preferential
treatment); Hamilton v. Caterpillar Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1227 (7th Cir. 1992) (considering
and rejecting argument that age discrimination, like race or gender discrimination, cuts
both ways); Greer v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1382, at *13-14
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2001) (reviewing plaintiffs claim that defendant's retirement plan was
unlawful because older employees with fewer years of service were receiving a higher
percentage of pension benefits).
7 See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2002) ("[t]he prohibitions in this Act shall be limited to
individuals who are at least 40 years of age"); see also Marinich v. Peoples Gas Light &
Coke Co., 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18722, at *13 (7th Cir. Sept. 10, 2002) (finding because
plaintiff was over forty years old, she was member of protected class for purposes of the
ADEA); Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1281 (9th Cir. 2000) (listing
membership in the protected class as the first requirement of a prima facie case under
ADEA), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 950 (2001).
8 This note does not consider any claims brought by persons outside the protected
class, i.e. persons under the age of forty.
9 See Timothy K. Giordano, Comment, Different Treatment for Non-Minority Plaintiffs
Under Title VII. A Call for Modification of the Background Circumstances Test to Ensure
that Separate is Equal, 49 EMORY L.J. 993, 993 n.1 (2000) ('The term 'reverse
discrimination' refers to situations in which members of traditionally favored groups in
society are targets of adverse discriminatory actions based on their majority status."); see
also Pribanic v. Westinghouse Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22604, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Sept.
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discrimination in favor of, rather than against, older
employees.1 0 The term "reverse" is utilized because the
discrimination is contrary to society's general perception of age
discrimination; this form of discrimination is against a person in
the majority group."
This paper will consider whether reverse age discrimination
claims should be recognized under the ADEA. As a vehicle for
consideration of this question, it will examine situations where
the employer enacts a reduction in force,12 and explains why
reverse age discrimination claims should be permitted under the
ADEA. Although the majority of courts have held that these
suits cannot be brought under the ADEA, the Sixth Circuit's
17, 1998) (explaining reverse discrimination as discrimination against the majority). See
generally Jeffrey Paul Fuhrman, Comment, Can DiscriminationLaw Affect the Imposition
of a Minimum Age Requirement for Employment in the NationalBasketball Association?,
3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L., 585, 591 (2001) (noting possible increase in reverse
discrimination suits brought by younger basketball players seeking entry into the NBA);
id. at 600 (explaining reverse age discrimination claims are based on being too young,
rather than too old).
10 See Mawhinney v. GMAC Comm. Mortgage Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5684, at
*2 (E.D. Pa.. Apr. 1, 2002) (explaining the court generally uses caution when considering
reverse discrimination suits); see also Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228 (concluding that the
ADEA does not provide a remedy for reverse age discrimination); Wehrly v. Am. Motor
Sales Corp., 678 F.Supp 1366, 1381 (N.D. Ind. 1988) (holding that plaintiff cannot show
age discrimination where the employer denied special early retirement because he was
too young).
11 For example, a younger employee claiming an older employee is being treated
better; a white employee claiming a black employee is being treated better; a male
employee claiming a female employee is being treated better, etc. Legal dictionaries'
definitions of "reverse discrimination" may not be perfect guides in the age discrimination
context. The term "reverse discrimination" has been defined as "[p]referential treatment
of a class of persons who have suffered from past discrimination." MODERN DICTIONARY
FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION (3d ed. 2001). Black's Law Dictionary has defined the term as
"[p]referential treatment of minorities, usu. through affirmative-action programs, in a
way that adversely affects members of a majority group." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th
ed. 1999). Scholars have noted that various interpretations of the term have developed
over the years. See, e.g. Susan C. Thies, Comment, Mills v. Health Care Service
Corporation: Are "Background Circumstances" Too Much to Ask of a Plaintiff Alleging
Reverse Discriminationin Employment?, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 537, 541 n.24 (2000).
12 See generally Karlen v. City Coils. of Chi., 837 F.2d 314, 317 (7th Cir. 1988) ("The
purpose of such [early retirement] programs often is to ease out older employees, whether
because they cost the employer more in salary or fringe benefits, or have gone stale, or are
blocking advancement for the ambitious young."); Minnesota v. Ind. School Dist. No. 624,
509 N.W.2d 572, 573 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing teachers' association contentions
that the early retirement program can serve as an "income buffer" for those who desire to
retire early, provide jobs for new workers, reinvigorate the work force by preventing
burnout, and allow for cost saving benefits for both employer and unions); Michael C.
Harper, Age-Based Exit Incentives, Coercion, and the Prospective Waiver of ADEA Rights:
The Failureof the Older Workers Benefit ProtectionAct, 79 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1274 (1993)
(stating that any pension plan providing retirement benefits to employees of minimum
age encourages older workers to leave employment, and therefore conflicts with goals of
ADEA).
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recent decision in Cline v. General Dynamics Land Systems,
Inc.13 provides a strong argument for allowing such claims. Cline
is an important case, as the Supreme Court recently granted the
defendant employer's petition for a writ of certiorari and will
hear the case in November 2003.14
In support of the conclusion that reverse age discrimination
suits brought under the ADEA should be permitted, this paper
will analyze the proper statutory interpretation of the Act and
review the interpretation given to it by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.
The note will also compare
interpretations of the ADEA with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
and evaluate state cases analyzing the Act and state statutes
similar to the ADEA for further support of the conclusion that
reverse age discrimination should be permitted under the Act.
This paper will not argue that all reverse discrimination suits
should be permitted. The argument here is that all persons
within ADEA's protected class should be permitted to bring an
action for discrimination if the facts permit, regardless of
whether they are younger or older than the party receiving the
preferential treatment. In other words, the premise of this
argument is that if an employee over forty is discriminated
against on the basis of his age, he should be able to bring an
action under the ADEA. It is irrelevant whether the employee
receiving preferential treatment is younger or older.
I. THE AGE DIsCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act was enacted in
1967 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of age in the "terms,
13 296 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2002). See generally Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection
Incorporation,88 VA. L. REV. 951, 992 (2002) (describing Cline as the notable exception to
consensus among lower courts that the ADEA does not bar reverse age discrimination);
Michael P. Maslanka & Burton D. Brillhart, Appearances Can Be Deceiving: Employment
Laws Contain Hidden Dangers for General Counsel, N.J.L.J., Dec. 9, 2002 (reporting on
the Cline decision and describing it as a counterintuitive development in employment
law).
14 Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 123 S.Ct. 1786 (2003). See generally U.S.
Supreme Court to Hear "Reverse Discrimination"Claim of Age Discrimination,available
at http://www.zevnik.com /reverse discrim.html (last visited August 19, 2003) (remarking
the Court agreed to hear the case and describing the purposes of the ADEA); David G.
Savage, Supreme Court to Hear Reverse Age Bias Case, L.A. TIMES, April 22, 2003 at 15
(noting the Court agreed to hear this "reverse discrimination" suit, which is the first case
of this nature to reach the Court).
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conditions, or privileges of employment."15 The "easy" age
discrimination claim is when an employee over age fortyl 6 brings
an action claiming that the employer discriminated against him
by giving preferential treatment to another employee under age
forty. The difficult question is how the ADEA applies to younger
persons within the protected class. As the author of a recent law
review article observed, "it is unclear whether the Act applies
symmetrically to those covered by it."17
The ADEA states: "it shall be unlawful for an employer to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age."18 The term "any individual"19 is
defined in a subsequent section of the ADEA as "individuals who
are at least 40 years of age." 20 This plain language clearly
indicates that an employer is not permitted to discriminate
against any worker who is over the age of forty on the basis of his
or her age, making no distinction between discrimination in favor
of younger or older persons. 2 1 The legislative record indicates
15 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2002). See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978) ('The
ADEA broadly prohibits arbitrary discrimination in the workplace based on age."). See
generally Dorf, supra note 13, at 992 (noting that the ADEA is now a key provision of the
body of federal anti-discrimination law, which itself is among those "core super-statues"
that have attained a quasi-constitutional status); id. at 952 (explaining that while courts
subject most forms of official discrimination to minimal scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause, exacting scrutiny is reserved for laws and policies employing suspect
and semi-suspect classifications).
16 See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2002) (defining age requirement of the protected class); see
also supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing age requirement for protected status
under the ADEA); cf. 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (2002) (providing the minimum age provision,
also age 40, for ADEA protection of federal employees).
17 Dorf, supra note 13, at 993. Compare Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296
F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the plain language of the law requires the
conclusion that an employer may not discriminate against any worker age 40 or older on
the basis of age), reh. den., 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 20210 (6th Cir. 2002) with Hamilton v.
Caterpillar, 966 F.2d 1226, 1228 (7th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that the literal prohibitions
in the text of the statute may be over-inclusive, but refusing to "open the floodgates" of
litigation merely because of Congress' choice of more economical language).
18 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2002); see Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 577 (commenting that this
section serves as proscription of differential treatment of older workers with respect to
employment privileges); see also Cline, 296 F.3d at 467-69 (reviewing carefully this
section of the statute according to "familiar canons of statutory construction").
19 See DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 727 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding
that district court correctly observed that ADEA "focuses on individuals, and precludes
treatment of individuals as simply components of an age-based class"), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 916 (1995).
20 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2002); see DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 727 (observing that workers gain
substantive, valuable rights on their fortieth birthday).
21 In evaluating the language of §§ 623(a)(1) and 631 of the ADEA, the Supreme
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that Congress chose the age of forty because testimony suggested
this was the age at which employment discrimination became
evident.22 If the age limit were lowered, it would lessen the
"primary objective" of the ADEA.23

The ADEA does allow employers to make age distinctions
within bona fide employee benefit plans. 2 4 Section 621(b) of the
ADEA sets forth its purpose, which is "to promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment;
and to help
employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising
from the impact of age on employment." 25 Courts finding that the
ADEA does not allow the "reverse discrimination" suits such as
those brought forth by the plaintiffs in Cline v. General Dynamics
Court has found that it is irrelevant if one person in the protected class has "lost out" to
another within the class, "[as] long as he lost out because of his age." O'Connor v. Consol.
Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996). The plaintiff must establish a "causal link
between the offering of the positions and his age." See Bates v. Carborundum Co., 623
F.Supp. 613, 619 (N.D. Ind. 1985). For a general discussion of the age requirements
within the ADEA, see Gary Minda, Opportunistic Downsizing of Aging Workers: The
1990's Version of Age and Pension Discriminationin Employment, 48 HASTINGS L. J. 511,
534-35 (1997).
22 See HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
ACT OF 1967, H.R. REP. NO. 90-805, (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2219
(remarking the committee changed the age limit from 45 to 40, because of discriminatory
evidence). See generally Arthur J. Marinelli, Age Discriminationand Reductions-In.Force,
20 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 277, 278 (1993) (discussing Congressional intent behind passing
ADEA); Jessica Dunsay Silver, From Baby Doe to Grandpa Doe: The Impact of the Federal
Age DiscriminationAct on the 'Hidden' Rationing of Medical Care, 37 CATH. U. L. REV.
993, 1029-30 (1988) (revealing motivational factor in Congressional approval of ADEA).
23 See HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
ACT OF 1967, H.R. REP. No. 90-805, (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2219
(remarking that the purpose of the law is "the promotion of employment opportunities for
older workers."). See generally Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers,
DisparateImpact, and the Age Discriminationin Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REV. 229,
321 n.28 (1990) (noting Congressional findings regarding age); Marinelli, supra note 22,
at 278 (signifying Congress' belief that a lower age would affect objective of ADEA).
24 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (2002). These benefit plans "do not need to be based on a
business purpose." Marinelli, supra note 22, at 279; Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978
(1990) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 621). Congress enacted the Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act ("OWBPA") in 1990, which placed employee benefits "squarely
within the protective custody of the ADEA" and made it clear that "age-based distinctions
in employee benefits must be cost-justified." Riva v. Massachusetts, 61 F.3d 1003, 1003
(1st Cir. 1995). Section 103 of the OWBPA amended section 4 of ADEA, and permits
voluntary early retirement incentive plans that "provide employees with a financial
inducement to leave the workforce voluntarily" and such plans are permissible provided
that they do not require or permit the involuntary retirement of employees and are not
inconsistent with ADEA's purposes. DuPriest v. Bentsen, 1994 EEOPUB LEXIS 3689, at
*4 n.3 (E.E.O.C. May 6, 1994) Some have opined that the enactment of OWBPA "can be
hailed as further proof of a national consensus against age discrimination." Harper, supra
note 12, at 1271.
25 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2002).
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often cite this section of the Act, focusing on the phrase "older
persons." 26

II. THE OPPOSING VIEWS
The majority of federal courts that have faced the question
have found that the ADEA does not recognize reverse age
discrimination claims. Most courts believe that the legislative
intent in enacting the ADEA was to protect older employees from
age discrimination. 27 This note will analyze the majority
perspective first, using Hamilton v.

Caterpillar28 as a case

representative of the approach taken by the majority of federal
courts. 29 These opinions generally find that the purpose of the

ADEA was to prevent discrimination of older employees in the
26 See Hamilton v. Caterpillar, 966 F.2d 1226, 1227 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that
the Act would not have denoted age limitations had it intended to allow reverse
discrimination suits); see also Greer v. Pension Benefit Gaur. Corp., 2001 WL 127307, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2001) (indicating that plaintiffs case in this action fails on reverse
discrimination grounds because ADEA contains a minimum age threshold). See generally
Fuhrman, supra note 9, at 601 (commenting that Seventh Circuit held reverse
discrimination is not actionable under ADEA in Hamilton).
27 See Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228 ('There is no evidence in the legislative history [of
the ADEA) that Congress had any concern for the plight of workers arbitrarily denied
opportunities and benefits because they were too young."); see also Hines v. Ohio State
Univ., 3 F.Supp.2d 859, 871 (S.D. Ohio 1998) ('The overall legislative history of the ADEA
therefore confirms that Congress' purpose in extending the ADEA to state and local
governments was to prohibit discriminatory conduct and ensure equal treatment to older
citizens."). See generally Mary Elizabeth Metz, Comment, Waivers Under the Age
Discrimination In Employment Act, 59 UMKC L. REV. 351, 356 (1991) (discussing
protective purpose afforded to older employees under ADEA).
28 966 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1992).
29 See Stone v. Travelers Corp., 58 F.3d 434, 437 (9th Cir. 1995) (claiming
unsuccessfully under the ADEA that he was denied the option of taking a severance
benefit in the form of a life annuity because he was too young); Schuler v. Polaroid Corp.,
848 F.2d 276, 277 (1st Cir. 1988) (arguing constructive discharge by employer after it
instituted a reduction in force); Karlen v. City Colls. of Chi., 837 F.2d 314, 314 (7th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1044 (1988) (finding that early retirement plan treating
employees better as he ages is not suspect under ADEA); State Police for Automatic Ret.
Ass'n v. Difava, 164 F.Supp.2d 141, 152 (D.Mass. 2001) (explaining that to the extent that
ADEA provides a private cause of action, it is only to the point of protecting older workers
from being "passed over" in favor of younger employees); Dittman v. General Motors, 941
F.Supp. 284, 287 (D.Conn. 1996) (granting employers motion for summary judgment
because ADEA does not bar discrimination against younger employees in favor of older
ones), affd, 116 F.3d 465 (2d Cir. 1997); Parker v. Wakelin, 882 F.Supp. 1131, 1140
(D.Me. 1995) ("[t]he ADEA has never been construed to permit younger persons to claim
discrimination against them in favor of older persons. Indeed, the existence of a
minimum age requirement suggests that it was only discrimination in favor of younger
individuals that the law is designed to prohibit."), affd in part and rev'd in part, 123 F.3d
1 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1106 (1998); Rannels v. Hargrove, 731 F.Supp.
1214, 1216 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (claiming the "Club 50" program at a bank giving C.O.D.
purchasers over age fifty additional interest on their certificates violated the ADEA).
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workplace, and thus only older employees should be protected by
the Act.
However, several courts have found that the ADEA does allow
for such reverse discrimination suits, provided that the party
bringing the action falls within the ADEA's protected class. 30
Cline v. General Dynamics is demonstrative, and will be explored
as representative of those cases permitting reverse age
discrimination suits under the ADEA. These courts also look to
the ADEA, noting that nowhere does it permit only older workers
to bring suits. Thus, the courts take the position that provided
the employee is within the protected class of the ADEA, he
should be permitted to bring an action.
Since both Hamilton and Cline involved age discrimination
claims in the context of a reduction in force ("RIF'), it is
worthwhile to provide some background information on RIF's.
RIF's
generally fall
into three
groups: 3 1 involuntary
termination, 32 layoff (where the right of recall exists), 33 or
voluntary
separation
or
retirement. 34
Most
reverse
30 See Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Systems, Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2002)
(holding a reverse discrimination claim exists on the specific facts present); see also
Brennan v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 950 F.Supp. 545, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (indicating that
suit based on reverse discrimination is possible if plaintiff is member of protected class).
See generally Lawrence v. Town of Irondequoit, 246 F.Supp.2d 150, 161 (W.D.N.Y. 2002)
(noting the Sixth Circuit's decision in Cline represents the minority rule); Fuhrman,
supra note 9, at 601 (highlighting fact that the current trend in ADEA litigation is to
allow claims based upon reverse discrimination).
31 See Marinelli, supra note 22, at 283 (indicating that three groups of RIF exist); see
also Blackwell v. Cole Taylor Bank, 152 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding ADEA
applies to constructive as well as express terminations); Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d
149, 161 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating "[tihe 'discharge' element of an ADEA claim may be either
an actual termination of the plaintiffs employment by the employer or a 'constructive'
discharge").
32 Examples include unit or plant closure, discharge for termination, and early or
mandatory retirement. It has been held that a plaintiff, who was member of ADEA's
protected class that had accepted employer's offer to retire was constructively discharged,
as this occurs when the offer presented served as a choice between early retirement with
benefits or discharge without benefits, an otherwise "impermissible take-it-or-leave-it
choice between retirement or discharge." Vega v. Kodak Caribbean, 3 F.3d 476, 480 (1st
Cir. 1993). Courts have routinely accepted that an ADEA claim may be predicated upon
claim of constructive discharge. Carr v. Cohen, 44 F.Supp.2d 1240, 1248 (M.D.Ala. 1999).
For a discussion on involuntary termination, see generally Marinelli, supra note 22, at
283.
33 See Cassidy v. Akzo Nobel Salt, 308 F.3d 613, 618 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that
"reduction in workforce" generally covers situations where employer forces layoffs due to
poor economy). See generally Garcia v. Pueblo Country Club, 299 F.3d 1233, 1238-39 (10th
Cir. 2002) (discussing that a reduction in force may be justified, but that employers may
not use layoffs and rehiring in a method that would be discriminatory if performed during
employment).
34 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(A) (2002) (stating that seniority systems shall not require
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discrimination actions brought under the ADEA involve this
In actions alleging voluntary separation or
third category.
retirement, 3 5 plaintiffs argue that they were pressured to retire,
and had no choice but to do so.36 These plaintiffs argue they were
effectively pushed out the door. 37 There are also a handful of
cases brought under ADEA that center around involuntary
termination claims. 3 8 With involuntary termination claims,
plaintiffs argue that their employer terminated them on the basis
of their advanced age.
An employer's decision to implement a RIF does not
necessarily violate the ADEA,39 as courts are not willing to
or permit involuntary retirement of covered employee because of that employee's age); 29
U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(ii) (mandating that voluntary early retirement incentive plan be
consistent with relevant purposes of ADEA).
35 See Corral v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 2000 WL 61315, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 2000)
(arguing that company breached fiduciary duty upon adopting early retirement program
immediately after plaintiffs retirement). See generally Patton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
2000 WL 1681017, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000) (indicating plaintiff had been offered early
retirement by employer); Michael J. Van Sistine & Bruce Meredith, The Legality of Early
Retirement Incentive Plans: Can Quantum Physics Help Resolve the Current Uncertainty,
84 MARQ. L. REV. 587, 588-89 (2001) (discussing manner in which various courts treat
early retirement incentive plans and the "difficult conceptual challenge[s]" these plans
present).
36 See Cockrell v. Boise Cascade Corp., 781 F.2d 173, 177 (10th Cir. 1986) (stating
constructive discharge within context of age discrimination suit "occurs when employer
deliberately makes or allows employee's working conditions to become so intolerable that
employee has no choice but to quit"); see also Belgrave v. Pena, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13141 at *37 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2000) (finding there must be inferences of discrimination
to claim constructive discharge); Rathemacher v. IBM Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20059
at *2-3 (D.N.J. Nov. 19, 1990) (discussing plaintiffs claim that he was constructively
discharged by being forced to accept retirement plan because of employer's discriminatory
behavior).
37 Courts have noted that "constructive discharge of an employee occurs when an
employer, rather than directly discharging an individual, intentionally creates an
intolerable work atmosphere that forces an employee to quit involuntarily." Berger v. Port
Authority, 150 F. Supp.2d 504, 507 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life.
Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 1996)). Specific criteria has been analyzed by the courts in
determining whether a termination program is acceptable. Davis v. General Motors Corp.,
2000 Mich. App. LEXIS 2851, *14 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2000). These early retirement
incentive programs also raise questions under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2003), particularly with respect to disclosure
issues. However, this discussion is too far removed from the purposes of this paper and
will not be examined here. Nevertheless, it has been found that plaintiffs request for
creation of common law duty "requiring prior disclosure of anticipated amendments to
pension plans" directly conflicts with ERISA law. Williams v. Williamson-Dickie Mfg. Co.,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14781, *13 (S.D.Ala. Apr. 30, 1991).
38 See Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that required
"discharge element" of ADEA claim may be satisfied by either actual termination of
plaintiff's employment by employer or constructive discharge); see also Hernandez v.
Crawford Bldg. Material Co., 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 3175, at *9 (5th Cir. Feb. 21, 2003)
(discussing discriminatory discharge claim); Ralis v. RFEfRL, Inc., 770 F.2d 1121, 1122
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (alleging involuntary termination of employment ran afoul of ADEA).
39 See, e.g., Stringfellow v. Monsanto Co., 320 F.Supp. 1175, 1180 (W.D.Ark. 1970)
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substitute their business judgment for that of an employer.40
Therefore, courts that are faced with deciding reverse
discrimination cases turn to the issue of intent. Thus, in a RIF
case, in addition to showing that he or she is within the protected
group, has been adversely affected, and was qualified to assume
another position at the time of discharge, the plaintiff must show
that the employer intended to discriminate on the basis of age in
reaching its decision to discharge an employee.41 Perhaps the
courts should approach the issue of the employer's intent in
discriminating with greater scrutiny, but be more liberal in
permitting the reverse discrimination cause of action. However,
that is a separate issue, and the question turns to whether the
cause of action should be permitted at all.
A. The Majority: Hamilton v. Caterpillar42
In early 1986, Caterpillar, Inc., a manufacturer of construction
and mining equipment, 4 3 announced that it was considering
(finding termination of employees following plant reduction and shutdown of portion of
operations, when based on performance and ability instead of seniority, is not violation of
ADEA); see also Cova v. Coco-Cola Bottling Co., 574 F.2d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1978) (finding
statistical evidence of age discrimination inconclusive); Nat'l Cash Register v. Riner, 424
A.2d 669, 672 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980) (holding not every personnel decision by an employer
resulting in different treatment of individuals in protected class is violation of ADEA).
40 See Brownlow v. Edgecomb Metals Co., 867 F.2d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating
that disagreements with soundness of employer's business judgment are beyond scope of
fact finder); McCloskey v. Union Carbide Corp., 815 F.Supp. 78, 81 (D.Conn. 1993)
(finding that restructuring or reorganizing corporate operations to cut costs and increase
efficiency is legitimate non-discriminatory reason for employee termination). But see
Marinelli, supra note 22, at 284 ("[ijf the plaintiff has a 'smoking gun' showing that age is
a factor in the RIF selection process, it will be difficult to convince a jury that the
employer did not violate the ADEA ... a plaintiff may [also] use statistical proof which
demonstrates a statistically significant adverse impact, which cannot be justified by
business reasons of the RIF, on members of the protected class"). See generally Phillips v.
Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5493, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1995)
(terminating employees as result of RIF presumes that eliminated or unfilled positions'
job functions are redistributed among remaining employees).
41 See Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 342 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating
plaintiff must show discriminatory reason that motivated employer); Thornbrough v.
Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1985) (explaining that ultimate
issue in disparate treatment suit is whether employer intentionally discriminated against
plaintiff); see also Beaird v. Seagate Tech., 145 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding
that in order for claimant to make out prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under
ADEA, must prove some evidence of employer discriminatory intent in reaching its RIF
decision).
42 966 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1992).
43 See Caterpillar Company Information, available at http://www.cat.com/about_ cat/
index.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2003) (describing Caterpillar, a Fortune 500 Company, as
"the world's largest manufacturer of construction and mining equipment, diesel and
natural gas engines and industrial gas turbines."); see also Dan Thanh Dang, Making the
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closing two of its plants in Iowa. 44 The company subsequently
entered into negotiations with the union representing the
employees at these two plants. 45 In July of that same year,
Caterpillar agreed to establish a "Special Early Retirement
Program" if the company did indeed close its Iowa plants.46 The
previously existing plan provided early retirement benefits to
employees aged sixty or older with ten years of service with the
company and to employees fifty-five or older with terms of service
that, when added to their age, totaled eighty-five.4 7 The new
Special Early Retirement Program extended the early retirement
benefits to employees who were fifty or older with ten years of
service. 4 8 The two plants were subsequently shut down and all of
the employees were laid off by June 1988.49
In 1990, Michael Hamilton, a former Caterpillar employee,
brought a class action against Caterpillar, claiming that its
Special Early Retirement Program was a violation of the
ADEA.5O The class members were all former employees between
the ages of forty and fifty who had ten years of service prior to
the closing of the plants. These employees brought the action
because they were too young to qualify for Caterpillar's early
Switch To On-Site Electricity; Technology: With Distributed Generation, Companies Can
Avoid Power Interruptions and Volatile Energy Prices, BALT. SUN, Mar. 24, 2002, at 1C
(citing Caterpillar as the leading manufacturer of construction and mining equipment).
44 See Hamilton v. Caterpillar, 966 F.2d 1226, 1226 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing closing
of plants).
45 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1226 (noting Local 215 of the United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America represented the affected employees).
46 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227 (discussing retirement program). See Steven Fromm,
Generation v. Generation, CONN. L. TRIB., Oct. 28, 1996, at 1 (discussing special early
retirement plan in Hamilton); see also No 'Reverse Bias' Under ADEA, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 3,
1992, at 25 (explaining special early retirement program for laid-off workers in
Hamilton).
47 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227 (explaining previous retirement plan). See Marc D.
Sherman, Reverse Age Bias Claim Denied By Appeals Court, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 24,
1992, at 5 (discussing special early retirement program for plants that were subject to
being closed); see also Christi Harlan, Law; Reverse Age-Discrimination,WALL ST. J., July
27, 1992, at B8 (citing Hamilton).
48 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227 (discussing Special Early Retirement Program). See
John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, Reverse Age Discrimination, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 1,
1993, at 3 (discussing retirement plan in Hamilton which extended early retirement
benefits to workers fifty or older with at least ten years of service); see also Eric
Matusewitch, Courts Are Ruling That Young Workers Are Protected, EMP. LITIG. REP.,
May 9, 2000, at 3 (citing Hamilton).
49 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227 (discussing closing of plants). See Furfaro & Josephson,
supra note 48, at 3 (discussing Caterpillar's Davenport and Bettendorf, Iowa, plants).
50 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227. In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit uses the word
"bizarre" to characterize the substance of the class action claim, implying it was ridiculous
for plaintiffs to sue on the basis of being too young. Id.
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retirement benefits. 5 1
The district court dismissed plaintiffs claim with prejudice,
finding that the ADEA did not prohibit reverse age
discrimination.5 2 The Hamilton suit subsequently reached the
Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the district court's ruling. 53 The
court supported this finding with three arguments. The Seventh
Circuit first explained that if Congress had truly intended to
prevent "reverse" age discrimination in enacting the ADEA, it
would not have limited the protected class to those forty and
above, as that would be nonsensical. 54 Secondly, the court
observed that several courts have found that the ADEA does not
forbid treating older workers more generously than younger
workers.5 5 Finally, the Seventh Circuit relied on the findings
51 Id. (explaining class members). Plaintiffs make an interesting, albeit unsuccessful,
argument, claiming that discrimination on the basis of age is similar to race or sex
discrimination, as all "cut[s] both ways." By this statement, plaintiffs mean that in a sex
discrimination case, either a man or a woman could bring an action, alleging they were
discriminated against on the basis of their gender. Plaintiff analogized this to age,
arguing the young as well as the old can bring suits. However, the Seventh Circuit
explained this argument was invalid, as age is not a distinction arising at birth, nor is it
immutable. Id. For a general discussion of the plaintiffs argument, see Sherman, supra
note 47, at 5.
52 See Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227 (stating Judge Mihm's opinion held ADEA does not
prohibit reverse age discrimination); see also Furfaro & Josephson, supra note 48, at 3
(discussing district court holding that ADEA does not prohibit kind of reverse
discrimination alleged by Hamilton); No 'Reverse Bias' Under ADEA, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 3,
1992, at 25 (citing district court ruling that ADEA does not provide remedy for class of
laid-off workers between ages of 40 and 50).
53 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228 (affirming district court's ruling). See Fromm, supra
note 46, at 1 (citing 7th Circuit decision); see also Employee Fails To Establish That He
Has Actionable Reverse Age Discrimination Claim; Greer v. Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp., N.Y.L.J., Mar. 2, 2001, at 17 (quoting 7th Circuit holding).
54 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228. Although not clearly explaining why this would make
'little sense," it may be inferred that the court meant that if Congress intended the ADEA
to permit suits brought by younger employees against older, then there would be no age
limits, i.e. no enumerated protected class. Cases have repeatedly recognized that the
purpose of the ADEA was to protect people between the ages of 40 and 65 from
discrimination and promote employment of those employees. See generally Brennan v.
Paragon Emp., 356 F.Supp. 286, 288 (S.D.N.Y 1973); Gill v. Union Carbide Corp., 368
F.Supp. 364, 367 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
55 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227 (citing Stone v. Travelers Corp., 58 F.3d 434 (9th Cir.
1996)), which held that the ADEA does not forbid treating older workers more generously
than younger workers. See Schuler v. Polaroid Corp., 848 F.2d 276, 277-78 (1st Cir. 1988).
Schuler sued Polaroid, claiming he was constructively discharged. Plaintiff was fiftyseven and had worked for the employer for thirty-three years. In 1985, Polaroid
underwent a corporate reorganization and reduced its workforce. It developed a severance
plan offering two and a half years severance pay to select employees as an incentive to
resign. Employees with greater seniority received greater benefits. Plaintiffs job was
effectively abolished, and he was offered a far inferior position. His supervisor urged him
to accept the severance plan. He did, but then brought suit, arguing his employer forced
him out of the company because he was too old. Defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment, which was affirmed by the First Circuit upon plaintiffs appeal. The rationale
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preceding the congressional statement of purpose in section 621
of the ADEA,56 referring to problems faced by "older workers"
and "older persons." 5 7 The court considered the phrase "arbitrary
age discrimination," and decided that this "refers to Congress'
understanding that discriminating against older people on the
basis of their age is arbitrary." 5 8 However, the Hamilton court
did concede that Congress could have written the ADEA more
clearly. 5 9 Interestingly, the court could have decided that there
was no intent to discriminate in this case, but instead found that
plaintiffs had no cause of action whatsoever. However, the
Seventh Circuit's concern did not look to that question, but
stopped at the outright denial of the cause of action. 6 0
B. The Minority: Cline v. General Dynamics
Until recently, merely a handful of district courts permitted
of the decision was based on the finding that the ADEA doesn't forbid treating older
persons more generously than others. It has been held that an early retirement plan that
treats older persons better is not suspect under the ADEA. Karlen v. City Colls. of Chi.,
837 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1044 (1988). It should be noted
that before 1989 it was impermissible to offer more generous retirement incentives to
persons under sixty than to otherwise similarly situated individuals over those ages. See
Charles B. Craver, The Application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to
Persons Over Seventy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 52, 98 (1989).
56 See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2002) (stating purpose of legislation is to promote employment
of older persons based on ability rather than age; to prohibit discrimination on account of
age; and to aid workers in meeting impacts that come with age). See generally Parker v.
Wakelin, 882 F.Supp. 1131, 1140 (D.Me. 1995) (using the Congressional purpose in § 621
to hold that no reverse age discrimination suit is permitted); Peter Janovsky, Note, Front
Pay: A Necessary Alternative To Reinstatement Under the ADEA, 53 FORDHAM L. REV.
579, 580 (1984) (stating the ADEA's purposes are "to promote employment of older
persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment; and to aid workers in meeting impacts that come with age").
57 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228. See generally Chapman v. Al Transp., 229 F.3d 1012,
1046 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that ADEA was intended to combat stereotypes that older
persons are less effective workers).
58 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227 (citing Dorsch v. L.B. Foster Co., 782 F.2d 1421, 142829 (7th Cir. 1986)). Hamilton comments that age discrimination may be compared to
handicap discrimination, as Congress was worried that older people were being "cast
aside on the basis of inaccurate stereotypes" regarding their abilities, and the young, like
the "non-handicapped" cannot argue that they are "similarly victimized."
59 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227 (noting Congress' available alternative language, yet
refusing to "open the floodgates to attacks on every retirement plan because Congress
chose more graceful language").
60 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228. See generally Furfaro & Josephson, supra note 48, at 3
(noting 7th Circuit ruling regarding ADEA does not provide a remedy for discrimination
against younger employees on the basis of age); Arthur McCune, Lawsuit Over MinimumAge Benefits Rule Moves Ahead Banks In South Florida Still Lag Nation In Lending To
PoorAreas, Why Depends On Who's Talking, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV., Aug. 5, 2002, at
A9 (noting the Hamilton opinion means the ADEA "does not protect the young as well as
the old").
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reverse discrimination suits under the ADEA. In Cline,6 1 the
Sixth Circuit surprised, 62 if not angered, 6 3 many by separating
itself from the vast majority of federal decisions on reverse
64
discrimination claims under the ADEA, creating a circuit split.
The Cline court decided that the ADEA allowed a cause of action
for employees within the protected class claiming their employer
committed age discrimination by treating older employees within
the protected class more favorably than themselves. 6 5 In this
factual situation, the defendant employer initiated a reduction of
retiree health care benefits, and plaintiffs claimed the premise
66
was based on their age.
Dennis Cline, as well as 195 other employees of General
61 296 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2002).
62 See, e.g. Greenebaum Doll & McDonald P.L.L.C., 'Younger' ADEA-Protected
Workers Can Proceed With Discrimination Claim Ky. EMP. L. LETTER, Sept. 2002
(referring to Cline as a "truly shocking decision."); David L. Hudson, Older Workers Claim
Age Bias In Favor Of Elders: Appeals Court Ok's Suit That Splits Protected Class, ABA J.
REP., Aug. 2, 2002, at 29 (commenting that Cline decision surprised many advocates for
elderly and employment law experts); Kevin S. Smith, Reverse Discrimination Claims
Found Actionable In Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, IND. EMP. L. LETTER, Feb.
2003 (calling Cline decision "bizarre").
63 See Hudson, supra note 62, at 29 (quoting Ann Elizabeth Reesman, General
Counsel for Equal Employment Advisory Council, an employer advisory group, "[t]his
ruling runs counter to the purpose of the law"); Denlinger, Rosenthal & Greenberg, L.P.,
Silliest Opinion Of The Year (For Now), OHIO EMP. L. LETTER, Sept. 2002 (analyzing
Cline as obvious to all but judges of the Sixth Circuit that age discrimination laws are
designed to protect older employees). See generally Maslanka, supra note 13 (suggesting
that Cline decision is "counter-intuitive", and the opinion was "overly simplistic").
64 See Hotline Recent Decisions of Interest to the Corporate Counsel, CORP. COUNS.,
Aug. 2002 (commenting that Cline created circuit split by rejecting 1st and 7th Circuit
holdings that ADEA does not protect workers in this situation); see also Gibbons, Del Leo,
Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione, P.C., Sixth Circuit Allows Age Claim by Younger Workers
Older
Workers,
available at
Provided
Solely
to
for
Retiree Benefits
http://www.gibbonslaw.com/publications/articlesuser2.cfm?pubid=934 (last visited Aug.
21, 2003) (noting the Cline decision may have "far reaching implications for unionized and
non-unionized employers"); Sulloway & Hollis, P.L.L.C., Oh, To Be Young Again: Reverse
Discrimination Claim Permitted Under The ADEA, N.H. EMP. L. LETTER, Oct. 2002
("[wihether this decision is an aberration or the start of a trend remains to be seen."). See
generally G. Phillip Shuler, Younger But Still Old Workers Protected, LA. CONTRACTOR,
Oct. 2002, at 54 (noting that Cline decision creates a circuit split).
65 Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys, Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding
plaintiffs established a viable claim under the ADEA). See Gillian Flynn, The Maturingof
the ADEA; Legal Insight; Age DiscriminationIn Employment Act; Interview, WORKFORCE,
Oct. 1, 2002, at 86 (discussing facts and decision in Cline case). See generally, Younger
Employees Can Sue Contractor For Favoring Older Workers, GOV'T CONT. LITIG. REP.,
Aug. 15, 2002, at 7 (summarizing facts of Cline).
66 Cline, 296 F.3d at 468 (noting the new collective bargaining agreement only
provided full health benefits upon retirement to those that were fifty years of age or older
as of July 1, 1997). See generally Workers In 40s Can Sue Based On Treatment Favoring
Those Over 50, EMP. DISCRIMINATION L. UPDATE, Nov. 2002, at 1 (stating the cause of
action in Cline); Age Discrimination:Cline v. General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., EMP.
LITIG. REP., Aug. 6, 2002, at 7 (explaining the plaintiffs cause of action in Cline).
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Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. (hereinafter "General Dynamics"
or "the employer"),67 sued the employer after it entered into a
new collective bargaining agreement 6 8 (CBA2) with the
employees' labor union, United Auto Workers Union (UAW).69
This new agreement went into effect on July 1, 1997, upon the
expiration of the original collective bargaining agreement
(CBA1). While CBA1 provided full health benefits to retired
workers with an accumulated thirty years of seniority, 70 CBA2
provided that only employees fifty years of age or older as of July
1, 1997 remained eligible to receive full health benefits at the
time of retirement. 7 1
Although employers have no obligation to provide retiree
health benefits, the Supreme Court has held that even if an
employer is free not to provide these benefits, once it does provide
them, it cannot do so in a discriminatory fashion. 7 2 Although it
67 General Dynamics is a corporation authorized and existing under Delaware law
with its principal place of business in Sterling Heights, Michigan. See Plaintiffs Proof
Brief, p. 3(2), Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. Inc., 296 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2002) (No. 003468); see also General Dynamics Land Systems - Who We Are, available at
http://www.gdls.com, (last visited Aug. 21, 2003) (explaining General Dynamics Land
Systems operates a tank production facility and designs wheeled and amphibious combat
machinery for the U.S. Army, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the allied nations).
68 For a substantive discussion of another collective bargaining agreement, and the
analysis related to the agreement, see Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers Locals 605 & 985, 945 F.Supp. 980 (S.D.Miss. 1996), affid, 102 F.3d 551 (5th Cir.
1996). This collective bargaining agreement provision permitted employees between the
ages of sixty and sixty-five "to resist any efforts by [the employer] to transfer them to new
work locations." Id. at 984. The court found that the provision, on its face, explicitly
favored members of the protected group (between ages sixty and sixty-five) over other
members of the protected age group with respect to an employment benefit. Id. at 985.
The court found that the provision against transferring was keyed to the employee's age,
and this facially violated the ADEA. Id.
69 Cline, 296 F.3d at 467; Plaintiffs Proof Brief, p. 3(5), Cline (No. 00-3468). All
plaintiffs were current or former members of the UAW at the time the lawsuit was
brought. Unions can waive certain statutory rights of individual members through
collective bargaining, but may not waive any rights conferred by ADEA. EEOC v. County
of Calumet, 686 F.2d 1249, 1256-57 (7th Cir. 1982).
70 See Plaintiffs Proof Brief, p. 3(11), Cline (No. 00-3468); see also Flynn, supra note
65, at 86 (stating the circumstances of the old and new collective bargaining agreements
in Cline). See generally Workers In 40s Can Sue Based On Treatment Favoring Those Over
50, EMP. DISCRIMINATION L. UPDATE, Nov. 2002, at 1 (outlining facts in Cline regarding
old and new collective bargaining agreements).
71 Cline, 296 F.3d at 468. See Smith, supra note 62 (outlining facts of the collective
bargaining agreements at issue in Cline).
72 See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75 (1984) (interpreting Title VII,
finding "[a] benefit that is part and parcel of the employment relationship may not be
doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free... not to provide
the benefit at all"); see also DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 725 (3d
Cir. 1995) (stating in "privilege of employment" cases, it is irrelevant that the employer
had no obligation to provide a particular benefit to its employees, as once it decides to
grant an opportunity to some, it cannot deny this opportunity to others because of their
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was interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in the cited
decision, the Supreme Court has found that "[t]his interpretation
applies with equal force in the context of age
discrimination," 73 as the ADEA's substantive provisions "were
derived in haec verba from Title VII"74 and therefore, the same
analysis must be applied to both provisions. 7 5 For that reason,
although General Dynamics may not be required to provide
health benefits to its employees upon retirement, once it does so,
it cannot provide them in a discriminatory fashion. By changing
the policy, General Dynamics was discriminating against its
younger employees.
Plaintiffs 76 in Cline initiated charges with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"),77 alleging that
CBA2 discriminated against them on the basis of age. The
EEOC issued its determination on June 30, 1998, finding that
CBA2 adversely affected the plaintiffs by "imposing a limitation
on the level of benefits provided to them on the basis of age."7 8
After reviewing the facts, the EEOC determined that General
Dynamics employees who were between the ages of forty and
79
forty-nine on July 1, 1997 had been adversely affected.
age). See generally Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1385 n.4
(3d Cir. 1994) (stating similarities in purpose and structure of both the ADEA and Title
VII lead to parallel construction); Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818,
820 (5th Cir. 1972) ("with a few minor exceptions, the prohibitions of... [the ADEA] are
in terms identical to those of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964").
73 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).
74 Trans World Airlines, 469 U.S. at 121 (quotingLorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584
(1978)).
75 See Roark v. Levi Strauss & Co., 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2114, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 5,
2003) (stating same analysis for ADEA and Title VII claims); EEOC v. Fina Oil & Chem.
Co., 835 F.Supp. 330, 332 n.4 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (stating same analysis will be applied to
analysis is applied to Tile VII and ADEA claims). See generally Mitchell v. Data Gen.
Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1314-15 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating what plaintiff must prove to
establish claim under ADEA).
76 Plaintiffs divided themselves into three groups for the purpose of this suit. The
"Cline group" consisted of 183 current employees who had been eligible for full health
benefits upon retirement under CBA1 but not under CBA2. The "Babb group" was
comprised of ten employees who retired prior to July 1, 1997 to preserve their health
benefits under CBA1. Plaintiffs counsel argued that the Babb group considered the
retention of health benefits so crucial that they retired earlier then they had originally
planned so they could preserve these medical benefits under CBA1. The "Diaz group"
constituted three employees who retired after July 1, 1997 and were ineligible for health
benefits. All plaintiffs are longtime employees or recent retirees of defendant's Lima, Ohio
or Scranton, Pennsylvania plants. See Plaintiffs Proof Brief, at 5-6, Cline (No. 00-3468).
77 The EEOC assigned these charges numbers 220971198 and 220971199. See
Plaintiffs Proof Brief, at 5(20), Cline (No. 00-3468).
78 Plaintiffs Proof Brief, at 5(21), 16, Cline (No. 00-3468).
79 See EEOC Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (2003)

2003]

REVERSE AGE DISCRIMINATION SUITS AND THE ADEA

287

Following the EEOC's decision, the plaintiffs filed this action
in federal court, alleging violations under the ADEA, as well as
the applicable Ohio state statute,8 0 claiming that the provision of
health benefits solely to persons over the age of fifty was illegal
discrimination based on age. 8 1 Although the district court 8 2
conceded that CBA2 facially discriminated83 on the basis of age,
it found that the ADEA did not recognize claims for reverse
discrimination, opining that "the ADEA was drafted to aid 'older
workers', not those who suffer age discrimination because they
are too young."8 4 The district court judge granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of its
complaint,8 5 and the Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court's
("[i]t is unlawful in situations where this Act applies, for an employer to discriminate in
hiring or in any other way by giving preference because of age between individuals 40 and
over. Thus, if two people apply for the same position and one is 42 and the other 52, the
employer may not lawfully turn down either one on the basis of age, but must make such
decision on the basis of some other factor"); Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. 296
F.3d 466, 471 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating Cline and his colleagues were victims of age
discrimination). See generally Zanni v. Medaphis Physician Serv. Corp., 240 Mich. App.
472, 477 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (stating prohibition against age discrimination
encompasses discrimination against an individual because she is too young), appeal
denied, 463 Mich. 878 (2000).
80 See Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Systems, Inc., 98 F.Supp.2d 846, 848 n.1
(N.D.Ohio 2000) (stating legal tests are identical under federal and state statutes). See
generally Barker v. Scovill Inc., 451 N.E.2d 807, 810 (Ohio 1983) (discussing same
evidentiary standards apply under Ohio employment discrimination statute as Title VII);
Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Comm. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 421
N.E.2d 128, 131 (Ohio 1981) (stating sufficient evidence supporting employment
discrimination under Ohio statute is sufficient to find discrimination under Title VII).
81 Cline, 98 F.Supp.2d. at 848 (discussing plaintiffs claim). See generally Mills v.
Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 1999) ("it is well settled law that the
protections of Title VII are not limited to members of historically discriminated-against
groups"); Hoskins v. N.W. Mem'l Hosp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11801, at *9-10 (N.D.Ill.
June 28, 2002) (discussing reverse discrimination claims).
82 See Cline, 98 F.Supp.2d. at 846.
83 See DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 727 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[tlhe
touchstone of explicit facial discrimination is that the discrimination is apparent from the
terms of the policy itself' and when based on a protected trait, it may constitute per se or
explicit age discrimination in certain circumstances); see also Miss. Power & Light Co. v.
Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 605 & 985,945 F.Supp. 980, 985 (S.D.Miss. 1996), aff'd
102 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[b]ecause this provision against transferring is keyed to an
employee's age, it is facially violative of the ADEA.") (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)). See generally Trans World Airlines, Inc., 469 U.S. at
121 (stating transfer policy is discriminatory on its face).
84 Cline, 296 F.3d at 468.
85 Plaintiffs appeal asserted four reasons as to why dismissal of their complaint was
improper. The complaint sufficiently stated claims for relief under the ADEA and Ohio
Revised Code; the District Judge's characterization of the claim as on for "reverse age
discrimination" was erroneous; even if this claim was "reverse age discrimination," such
discrimination is precluded under both the ADEA and Ohio Revised Code. The district
court failed to address plaintiffs request for declaratory judgment. Plaintiffs Proof Brief,
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holding after careful consideration.8 6 Plaintiffs distinguished the
facts of their case from Hamilton8 7 and other federal cases with
similar holdings.88 The Cline plaintiffs argued that unlike the
aforementioned cases, theirs did not involve the mere "denial of a
gratuitous gift to workers below the age of fifty."89 With respect
to Hamilton, the employer had previously extended early
retirement benefits to employees aged sixty or older, and the new
agreement extended benefits to workers age fifty or older. The
second Hamilton agreement extended benefits to a larger group
of employees than the first, and no one was excluded that had
been included in the first agreement. Although the Cline opinion
did not recognize this, the factual circumstances in Cline were
significantly different from those of Hamilton.90 The second
collective bargaining agreement in Cline made benefits available
to fewer people than the first agreement. People who had been
protected under CBA1 were not necessarily protected under
CBA2. So, while the second Hamilton agreement benefited more
employees than its predecessor, the second Cline agreement
benefited fewer. 9 1 The facts of Hamilton and Cline can clearly be
at 6, Cline (No. 00-3468). On appeal the court stated, "Because the employers were
covered by the plain language of the statute, they were entitled to bring an action, even if
the group that was being treated more favorably was a group of older, as opposed to
younger, workers." Cline, 296 F.3d at 466.
86 Cline, 296 F.3d at 467, 472 (finding district court opinion departed from rules of
statutory construction and advised the lower court to hear plaintiffs declaratory
judgment argument based on standing and ripeness).
87 966 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1992).
88 See, e.g., Schuler v. Polaroid Corp., 848 F.2d 276, 278 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating ADEA
does not forbid treating older persons more generously than others); Dittman v. Gen.
Motors, 941 F.Supp. 284, 287 (D.Conn. 1996) (finding that the ADEA does not bar
discrimination of the young in favor of the old); Parker v. Wakelin, 882 F.Supp. 1131,
1140-41 (D.Me. 1995) (discussing ADEA does not provide relief to persons discriminated
against because they are too young).
89 Plaintiffs Proof Brief, Cline (No. 00-3468) (distinguishing facts from Hamilton,
where defendants revoked the plaintiffs' health care benefits solely on the basis of their
age).
90 There are clear differences in the two cases. Plaintiffs in Cline were between 40
and 49 years of age and were denied retirement benefits that individuals older than they
had received as a result of a collective bargaining agreement. 296 F.3d at 466. The
collective bargaining agreement provided health benefits upon retirement to those
employees that were over the age of 50, but did not provide health benefits upon
retirement to the employees that were between the ages of 40 and 49. Id. The court
subsequently decided that the plaintiffs did have standing to bring a claim under the
ADEA. Id. Plaintiffs in Hamilton were laid off and seeking retirement heath benefits that
were provided older workers. The district court decided that the retirement benefits were
a "bona fide" employee benefit plan protected by the ADEA. 966 F.2d 1226, 1226 (7th Cir.
1992).
91 The second agreement in Hamilton reduced the minimum age from 60 to 50 years
old. 966 F.2d at 1226. Therefore, it included a different group of beneficiaries without
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distinguished from each other and these differences are
significant.
The Cline court's opinion put great emphasis on statutory
construction, 9 2 particularly the elementary "plain meaning" rule.
Justice Ryan explained: "We rest our holding on familiar canons
of statutory construction too elementary to require a citation,
which direct courts to apply statutes consistent with their plain
language; that is, by assigning to the words of the statute their
primary and generally understood meaning." 93 The court's
statutory argument will be discussed in this note in greater
detail infra.
The court also noted that it does not believe this situation to be
one of "reverse discrimination," opining that the term has "no
ascertainable meaning in the law." 94 The Sixth Circuit believes
that an action is either discriminatory or it is not. It does not
understand how something can discriminate in the "reverse."
The court understands what is meant by the term, but believes it
to be a misnomer. 9 5 It found the plaintiffs in this action, who are
excluding any from the originally benefited group. The agreement in Cline changed the
benefits requirement from the amount of time with the company to a minimum age of 50.
296 F.3d at 466. Employees under age 50 previously meeting the first requirement were
excluded under the second agreement. Id.
92 Cline, 296 F.3d at 468-70 (explaining that the concept of statutory construction
and interpretation was the basis for the court's decision). See Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d
1484, 1495 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 1008 (1997) (noting that the first step in
interpreting a statute is always the language of the statute itself).
93 Cline, 296 F.3d at 467. Justice Ryan, in opening his opinion, remarked about the
fundamental nature of the plain meaning rule. Analysis of a statute can proceed no
further without taking such an elementary step. Applying the facial meaning of the words
is understood to the point of warranting no citation. However, if the plain meaning rule
dictates the analysis, then the method of interpreting the purpose of the statute is
impracticable. See State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562, 612 (Conn. 2003). Citing the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Cline, the Supreme Court of Connecticut commented that the plain
meaning rule has an impressive doctrinal pedigree, as its history can be traced as far back
as Blackstone's Commentaries in 1765. Id.
94 Cline, 296 F.3d at 471. Reverse age discrimination refers to the preferential
treatment of older workers as opposed to younger ones. Cline seemingly has reason to
prejudge such a claim in light of Hamilton. The court relied on the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission proclamation that if two people apply for the same position, an
employer may not base its decision solely on age. The EEOC's interpretation of the ADEA
"is significant because an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous provision within the
statute it is authorized to implement is entitled to judicial deference." Id. at 471 (quoting
Burzynski v. Cohen, 264 F.3d 611, 619 (6th Cir. 2001)).
95 Cline, 296 F.3d at 471 ("[p]resumably, what the district judge and others mean
when they conclude that the ADEA does not prohibit 'reverse discrimination' is that
otherwise prohibited discrimination is permitted if the victims are literally (statutorily)
within the protected class, but are a group within the protected class who in most cases
are the beneficiaries against others"); Id. at 472 (emphasizing that had Congress wanted
to limit the ADEA to protect only "those workers who are relatively older," it had the
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within the protected age group, to have suffered age
discrimination. As the Sixth Circuit aptly puts it, "the protected
class should be protected; to hold otherwise is discrimination,
plain and simple." 9 6 Here, plaintiffs, who were within the
ADEA's protected class, lost health benefits on the basis of their
age. Therefore, its provisions should protect them.
Justice Glen Williams dissented from the majority in Cline.9 7
His opinion made it clear that he was persuaded by the Hamilton
opinion, and believed that plaintiffs should not be permitted to
bring this claim under the ADEA.98 He believed Section 621 of
the ADEA evidenced congressional intent to prohibit employers
from discriminating against older workers, as opposed to younger
workers. 9 9 Justice Williams concluded his dissent by discussing
the "common sense" understanding of collective bargaining
agreements, opining that the ADEA was not intended to interfere
with the collective bargaining process or collective bargaining
agreements. 100

This is not the final word in the Cline matter. Following the
Sixth Circuit's decision in September 2002, the defendant
employer filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The court granted

authority and insight to do so). See generally Metro. Detroit Area Hosp. Servs. v. United
States, 634 F.2d 330, 334 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting that although the term is in the statute,
the more specific language normally supercedes the more general), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1031 (1981).
96 Cline, 296 F.3d at 471. See 29 U.S.C. § 631 (2002) (outlining ADEA's protection as a
class of employees at least 40 years old).
97 See Cline, 296 F.3d at 476-77 (J. Williams, dissenting) (arguing that the ADEA
claim should have been dismissed because the statute does not allow for "reverse
discrimination" and also was not meant to interfere with collective bargaining
agreements).
98 Id. at 476 (arguing that the ADEA makes reference to "older" workers and persons
in 29 U.S.C. § 621). See id. (criticizing that "no other court in the nation" has recognized
such a claim under the ADEA); see also Recent Case: Reverse DiscriminationSuits - Sixth
Circuit PermitsReverse Age DiscriminationSuit to Proceed, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1533, 1536
(2003) (noting Judge Williams' critique of the decision).
99 Cline, 296 F.3d at 476 (noting that the qualifying words are evidence of a
congressional intent to exclude younger workers); see Recent Case: Reverse Discrimination
Suits, supra note 98, at 1536 (remarking that Judge Williams believed the purpose of the
ADEA was to protect older persons from discrimination); Hudson, supra note 62, at 29
(stating a synopsis of Judge Williams' dissent).
100 Cline, 296 F.3d at 476 ("[t]he courts should not stand watch over labor unions who
represent employees of a company and interfere with their negotiations with employers.").
See id. (arguing that contracted systems of seniority, which are imperative to a collective
bargaining agreement, could be diluted). See generally Hudson, supra note 62, at 29
(mentioning Judge Williams remarked "no court in the nation has recognized a claim for
age discrimination under the ADEA when brought by younger workers within the
protected class").
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General Dynamics' motion in April 2003101 and plans to hear the
case in November 2003.
III. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
In attempting to determine whether claims for reverse
discrimination should be recognized under the ADEA, it is
helpful to evaluate the problem from several different
perspectives. The first is to consider the plain interpretation of
the ADEA and decide whether it is necessary to consider
legislative intent. The second argument will turn to the EEOC's
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the ADEA and apply
this to the facts of cases such as Hamilton and Cline, showing
why the EEOC's interpretation supports allowing these reverse
age discrimination claims. Next, consideration will be given as to
whether arguments applying to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
can be analogized to the ADEA and serve as persuasive in
deciding whether reverse age discrimination claims are
permitted under ADEA.
Finally, several state reverse age
discrimination claims will be evaluated to determine whether
any guidance can be procured from these arguments.
A. The "PlainMeaning"Interpretationof the ADEA Supports
Allowing Reverse Age DiscriminationActions
In determining how to apply a statute, the initial step is to
refer back to our first lesson in law school: simply look at the
language of the statute.1 0 2 As the Supreme Court noted in
Connecticut National Bank v. Germain,10 3 statutory language is
the "cardinal canon" to be addressed before all others. 10 4 When
101 Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 123 S.Ct. 1786 (2003). See generally Savage,
supra note 14 (noting the Court agreed to hear this "reverse discrimination" suit);
Supreme Court will decide "reverse"age discrimination issue, available at http://www.law
memo.com/emp/docs/us/cline.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2003).
102 See Cline, 296 F.3d at 468-69 (stating that the plain meaning of the statute must
be noted); Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1495 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997);
United States v. Ospina, 18 F.3d 1332, 1335 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Garcia v. United
States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984)) ("only the most extraordinary showing of contrary
intentions from [the legislative history] would justify a limitation on the 'plain meaning'
of the statutory language"), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1226 (1994).
103 503 U.S. 249 (1992) (holding that the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1292 provides
the court of appeals with jurisdiction over an interlocutory order of a district court
affirming a ruling of a bankruptcy court).
104 See id. at 253-54 (noting that a statute should be read plain on its face, unless
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the language of the statute is "plain and unambiguous, there is
no justification for resorting to legislative history to ascertain the
lawmaker's intent - the words of the statute suffice."105 As the
language of the ADEA does not restrict its protection to older
workers, younger workers within its protected class should be
permitted to bring these claims. In 1994, the Second Circuit held
that the issue to be decided in age discrimination cases is
"whether an employer discriminated against an employee on
account of that person's age."10 6 In reverse discrimination suits,
the employer is discriminating against employees on account of
their age. Therefore, these suits should be permitted. This plain
meaning interpretation of the ADEA supports permitting
younger workers within the protected class to bring the action.
Courts should apply the provisions of the ADEA as its
language mandates. Courts should not be making decisions
regarding the ADEA based on what they believe Congress meant
to say or should have said when it drafted the Act.107 This is
otherwise noted); United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989) ("as long
as the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there generally is no need for a court
to inquire beyond the plain language of the statute"); United States v. Goldenberg, 168
U.S. 95, 102-03 (1897) (stating that the courts do not have a legislative function, but must
receive the "will of the legislature.").
105 Cline, 296 F.3d at 469 (citing Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th
Cir. 1999)). See Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992) ("[i]n a statutory
construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and when a
statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all
but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished"); Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120
F.3d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 1997) ("[i]n construing a statute we must begin, and often
should end as well, with the language of the statute itself'); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1990) (postulating that courts engage in
"new textualism" by ascertaining a statute's plain meaning and thereafter rendering the
legislative history irrelevant); John M. Walker, Jr., Judges' Forum No. 2: Judicial
Tendencies in Statutory Construction:Differing Views on the Role of the Judge, 58 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 203, 217-18 (2001) (explaining that new textualists are those who
advocate "rigorous text-based statutory interpretation" and observing that Justice
Antonin Scalia as well as Judges Frank Easterbrook, James Buckley, Kenneth Starr and
Alex Kozinski often advance this theory in their opinions).
106 Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting
that even refusing interview on basis of age is actionable).
107 Commending the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Cline, Chicago employment lawyer
Wayne Giampietro commented,
I think the 6th Circuit got it right. It's nice to see a court that reads the
statute and does what the statute says instead of what in their mind the
legislature actually meant to say. I think the 6th Circuit is sending a
message to Congress: 'You guys are going to have to live with what you
pass. If you want the statute to read a certain way, then write it that way.'
Hudson, supranote 62, at 29.
After all, when the language is plain, "it is the sole function of the court to enforce it
according to its terms." Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). However,
the court must recognize that it would be a violation of the separation of powers to delve
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what happened in the Hamilton line of decisions. The opinion
chastised Congress for selecting economy over precision in
choosing the exact language of the statute, and offered better
suggestions.10 8 However, the Supreme Court has held that the
most persuasive evidence of Congressional intent is the statutory
language.1 09 Therefore, courts should look to the words that are
in the ADEA, not the words they think should be there.
Cases finding that the ADEA does not allow such suits look to
the purpose section of the ADEA, which evidences a concern for
"older workers."11o It is true that Congress was primarily
concerned with prohibiting age discrimination favoring younger
employees over their older counterparts. However, the section
does not state that the worker being discriminated against must
be older than the person receiving favorable treatment. The
term used is simply "older workers." Therefore, all this language
can be interpreted to mean is that Congress viewed all workers
aged forty and above as vulnerable due to their age, and enacted
into a legislative function such as providing the meaning of a statute rather than
exercising the will of the legislature; Goldenberg, 168 U.S. at 102-03.
108 The court in Hamilton criticized the Congress choice of words for the statute by
stating that:
The prohibitions in section 623 may be somewhat over-inclusive, but the
language Congress used is also more economical than the more precise
alternatives. Perhaps Congress should have written 'because such
individual is older' or 'on the basis of such individual's advancing age,' but
we are unwilling to open the floodgates to attacks on every retirement plan
because Congress chose more graceful language.
Hamilton v. Caterpillar, 966 F.2d 1226, 1228 (7th Cir. 1992).
See generally Sandra J. Carnahan, The Americans With Disabilities Act In State
Correctional Institutions, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 291, 299 (1999) (criticizing imprecise
statutory language as overly broad); Kimberly Hayes, Comment, On the Clock Versus on
the Books: The Appropriate Method for Counting Employees Under Title VII, the ADEA
and Other Labor Laws, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 963, 967 (1996) (noting difficulty in interpreting
ADEA coverage).
109 See Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966) ("[t]here is, of course,
no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the
legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes."); see also Gade v. Nat'l Solid
Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) (commenting that statutory language should
be used to determine congressional intent); Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S.
158, 176 (1989) (noting courts should focus on the language of the statute to determine
the wrongs Congress intended to correct), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 963 (1990).
110 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1) (2002) ("in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older
workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and
especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs"). See Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (mentioning congressional purpose of ADEA was to
protect older workers from discrimination in employment opportunities); Louis Maslow II,
Comment, Dual Liability: The Growing Overlap of the Age Discriminationin Employment
Act and Section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 58 ALB. L. REV. 509,
512 (1994) (arguing ADEA intended to protect older workers from prejudice).
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the ADEA to protect these workers.l' There is no limit set out
on this protection.
The congressional language, whether
intentional or otherwise, also bans age discrimination favoring
older over younger employees within the class. 112 If Congress
intended to limit the scope of the ADEA to protect only those
employees who claimed younger workers were being treated
better by the employer than older, it could have done s0. 1 13
Nothing prevented Congress from doing this. However, it chose
not to. The language of the statute allows suits brought by any
employee within the protected class. This includes both younger,
as well as older, persons within the protected class. Therefore,
claims such as those brought in Cline should be permitted.
Further, federal case law supports the proposition that these
reverse age discrimination actions should be permitted. In
Kralman v.

Illinois Department of Veterans' Affairs,114 the

Seventh Circuit held that "it is considered 'hornbook law' that the
ADEA action can be based on discrimination between older and
younger members of the protected class."11 5 It is important to
111 See Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1226 (finding section 621 was enacted to protect older
workers); James William Satola, Note, Taking the Early Flight Out to Pasture: The
Second Circuit Adds a New Wrinkle to Voluntary Early Retirement Programs Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 577, 587 (1989)
(remarking ADEA protects workers over forty years of age); Bryan B. Woodruff, Note,
Unprotected Until Forty: The limited Scope of the Age Discriminationin Employment Act
of 1967, 73 IND. L.J. 1295, 1296 (1998) (mentioning coverage of ADEA extends to all
workers forty and over).
112 See Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. 296 F.3d at 466, 472 (6th Cir. 2002)
(Cole, J., concurring) (stating language of statute although probably unintentional,
prohibits discrimination within the class of workers over age forty); see also O'Connor v.
Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996) ("[tlhe fact that one person in the
protected class has lost out to another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so
long as he lost out because of his age"), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1040 (1996). See generally,
Stephen E. Gruendel, Comment, Rejecting the Requirement That ADEA Plaintiffs
Demonstrate Replacement from Outside Protected Class: O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin
Caterers Corp., 38 B.C. L. REV. 347, 381 (1997) (remarking a plaintiff need not show
replacement by someone outside the protections of the ADEA).
113 See Cline, 296 F.3d at 472 (commenting Congress could have restricted the scope
of the ADEA); see also Woodruff, supra note 111, at 1299-1300 (noting legislative history
of ADEA and amendments enacted). See generally Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228 (criticizing
congressional use of overbroad language).
114 23 F.3d 150 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 948 (1994). The plaintiff in
Kralman brought suit against the Illinois Department of Veterans' Affairs, claiming he
was denied reinstatement to his position as a Veterans' Service Officer because of his
advanced age (seventy-one).
115 Id. at 155 (citing Miller v. Lyng, 660 F.Supp. 1375, 1377 n.2 (D.D.C. 1987)). See
Kralman, 23 F.3d at 155 ("although court held that plaintiff could not prevail on a
disparate impact claim where employees who were treated more favorably were also in
the protected age group, the court expressly stated that 'there is nothing to prevent' the
plaintiff from prevailing on a disparate treatment claim on the same facts.") (citing Lowe
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note that this is the same circuit that decided Hamilton, which
did not allow such suits. However, Kralman is a more recent
decision than Hamilton116 and more weight should be given to
the later decision. Further, the Seventh Circuit has also held
that "an employer is not insulated from liability for age
discrimination when he chooses among people in the protected
class."117

Plain language ought to control the interpretation of the
ADEA. The court should look beyond the text of a statute only
when one of the following circumstances occurs: (1) the text is
ambiguous; (2) a literal reading is inconsistent with other
statutory provisions; (3) the plain-language reading is
inconsistent with the congressional intent; (4) the plain statutory
meaning leads to "absurd results."118 If the text of the statute can
be read unambiguously and reasonably, it is improper for the
v. Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1372 (2d Cir. 1989)); 3A LARSON, EMP.
DISCRIMINATION § 98.53, at 21-59 (1990); see also Stalhut v. City of Lincoln, 145
F.Supp.2d 1115, 1123 (Dist. Ct. Neb. 2001) (finding that language of ADEA banned
discrimination against employees on basis of age, limiting protected class to those over
forty, and "the fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to another person in
") (quoting O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers
the protected class is thus irrelevant ..
Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996)). See generally Dennard and Kelly, supra note 3, at 735
(commenting on law governing application of disparate impact theory to ADEA cases is
not well settled and disparate impact theory "requires the plaintiff to show that a facially
neutral employment practice or policy has a discriminatory effect on the protected class").
116 Compare Kralman, 23 F.3d at 155 (holding plaintiff may prove an ADEA claim
even if the other employee is within the protected class), with Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228
(holding ADEA does not provide for "reverse discrimination" suits). See generally Paul
Mollica, Employment DiscriminationCases in the Seventh Circuit, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. &
EMP. POL'Y J. 63, 78 (1997) (discussing numerous ADEA cases decided in the Seventh
Circuit).
117 Mayall v. Peabody Coal Co., 7 F.3d 570, 572 (7th Cir. 1993) (ruling on a plaintiff
who was 66 years old and terminated in an effort to reduce costs after twenty years of
employment). See La Montagne v. Am. Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1411 n.4
(7th Cir. 1984) (holding that the mere fact an employee was replaced by someone younger
does not permit an inference that the replacement was motivated by age discrimination).
118 See Ltd., Inc. v. Comm'r, 286 F.3d 324, 332 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting canons of
statutory construction); Cline, 296 F.3d at 473 (Cole, J., concurring) (remarking there are
only four situations where a court should look outside the language of the statute itself);
Deere Credit Servs. v. Tenn. Dep't of Agric., 286 B.R. 622, 626 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing
Cline, 296 F.3d at 473, the Sixth Circuit notes that the law of the Circuit has been wellestablished and it is only permissible to look beyond the text of the statute in four
situations); Vergos v. Gregg's Enters., Inc., 159 F.3d 989, 990 (6th Cir. 1998) (declaring
the court's role in statutory interpretation); Appleton v. First Nat'l Bank, 62 F.3d 791, 801
(6th Cir. 1995) (asserting appropriate statutory interpretation method used by the Court);
see also Riva v. Massachusetts, 61 F.3d 1003, 1007 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[courts] need not
consult legislative history and other aids to statutory construction when the words of the
statute neither create an ambiguity nor lead to an unreasonable interpretation"); Matter
of Stone, 10 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating goal of statutory construction is to
ascertain legislative intent through statute's plain language without having to look to
legislative history or any extraneous sources).
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court to look at the statute's legislative history.
1. The text of the ADEA is not ambiguous.
If the language of a statute is ambiguous, a court is entitled to
look to its legislative history for guidance in interpretation.1 19
However,
when
congressional
intent
is
clearly
and
unambiguously expressed through its language, that is as far as
the courts will go, as "we must presume that Congress said what
it meant and meant what it said."120
Here, the language of the ADEA is unambiguous, and therefore
the courts should go no further than its plain language. As
previously stated, §623(a)(1) states that it is unlawful for an
employer to "discriminate against any individual with respect to
his.., privileges of employment because of such individual's
age."121 As discussed, a covered individual under the ADEA is an
employee aged forty or older. It is evident that the ADEA seeks
to protect persons from discrimination in the workplace on the
basis of age. Obviously ADEA claims must be limited to the
protected class, but aside from that sole limitation, the use of the
phrase "any individual" indicates that the ADEA's protections
should extend beyond employees who claim younger employees
are receiving preferential treatment.122
2. A literal reading of the ADEA is not inconsistent with other
statutory provisions.
"A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void
119 Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984) (remarking courts look to legislative
history in determining proper calculation of fee awards); Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist.,
801 F.2d 269, 270 (7th Cir. 1986) (determining the correct meaning of "employer" under
the ADEA), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987); Bell v. Trustees of Purdue Univ., 658
F.Supp. 184, 186 (N.D. Ind., 1987) (finding language of ADEA to be ambiguous with
respect to employers right to decline to contribute to benefit plans after employee who
reaches "normal" retirement age continues to work for the company).
120 United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 528 U.S.
933 (1999).
121 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2002) (emphasis added).
122 See Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 472 (6th Cir. 2002)
(noting language of statute prohibits discrimination within the class of workers over age
forty); Dorf, supra note 13, at 993 (2002) (remarking suits for reverse discrimination have
been permitted); Toni J. Querry, A Rose by Any Other Name No Longer Smells as Sweet:
Disparate Treatment Discriminationand the Age Proxy Doctrine After Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 530, 543 (1996) (noting protection of the ADEA extends to
entire class of protected employees).
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or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another
unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake or error."123
The only other clause that courts have looked to in deciding this
question is the Act's purpose clause. However, as discussed
above, the language of the purpose clause does not create a
conflict; the statutory provisions are consistent with each other.
3. The plain language reading of the ADEA is consistent with
congressional intent.
Courts are willing to look beyond the language of a statute that
would otherwise be clear when a literal reading of the statute is
inconsistent with its congressional purpose. 12 4 Courts are
concerned with construing statutes in a manner that is
consistent with the intent of Congress as expressed in its plain
meaning.125 Here, it is not necessary to turn to the question of
legislative history because the ADEA is unambiguous.
The
Supreme Court held that "legislative history is irrelevant to the
interpretation of an unambiguous statute."126
123 In re Catapult Entm't, 165 F.3d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting 2A NORMAN J.
SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (5th ed. 1992)). See, e.g. Colonial
Ins. Co. v. Tumbleson, 873 F.Supp. 310, 318 (D. Alaska 1995) (analyzing two sections of
auto insurance policy, court determines they are not inconsistent with each other, and
therefore court adopted literal meaning of statute).
124 See United States v. Klingler, 61 F.3d 1234, 1237 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[w]here a
literal reading of a statute is inconsistent with its clear legislative purpose, a less
mechanical interpretation may be warranted"); United States v. Ivey, 294 F.2d 799, 803
(5th Cir. 1961) (stating that even when plain meaning does not produce "absurd" results,
but merely "unreasonable" ones, the Court will follow the "unreasonable" purpose, rather
than literal words); C.I.R. v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904, 912 (5th Cir. 1961) (stating court
should look to what Congress said, not what it "might have intended to say if this case
had been presented as a specific problem for legislative resolution"); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Austin, 292 F.2d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 1961) (arguing a purely literal reading of the statute
in question is "far from decisive" and investigated congressional intent); see also Sciarotta
v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1988) (rejecting argument because literal reading of
statute would lead to results inconsistent with its purpose).
125 See United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) ( "[t]here is...
no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statue than the words which the
legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes."); Helvering v. City Bank Farmers
Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85, 89 (1935) (noting that the court will not construe a statue which is
plain on its face); see also Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1292-93 (5th Cir. 1987)
(explaining the duty of the court to interpret a statute by its plain meaning).
126 See Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 808-09 n.3 (1989) (holding that
where a statute is clear there is no need to look to legislative history); United Air Lines v.
McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 199 (1977) (noting that traditional canons of interpretation make
the legislative history of a statute irrelevant where it is unambiguous); see also Ortiz v.
Principi, 274 F.3d 1361, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining the process of statutory
construction begins with its plain meaning, and legislative history is not examined unless
the statute's language is not clear).
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Even if we look to Congressional intent, it does not support the
argument that reverse age discrimination actions should not be
allowed under the ADEA. Congressional intent in enacting the
ADEA was to protect older workers. The ADEA also states that
its protection only extends to workers forty and older. Therefore,
the ADEA defines persons forty and above as "older" and there is
12 7
no disagreement between sections of the statute.
4. This plain language does not do violence to the policy
underlying the ADEA.
In his dissenting opinion in Cline, Justice Williams argued, "I
believe it is obvious that the older a person is, the greater his or
her needs become."12 8 However, his statement is far from
"obvious." One's needs may depend on that particular individual
as well as his type of employment. Justice Williams made a
blanket statement about all older persons and failed to offer any
support to bolster his proposition. Finally, the "obviousness" of
his opinion bears little relevance on the issue of whether the
reverse age discrimination suits are actionable under the
ADEA.129

5. The results of interpreting the ADEA to permit "reverse age
discrimination" suits are not absurd.
Statutes should not be construed to produce absurd results.
Over a century ago, the Supreme Court stated,
127 See Ronald Turner, When the Court Makes Law and Policy (With Special
Reference to the Employment ArbitrationIssue), 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 287, 307308 (2002) (explaining that the statutory construction of the ADEA is left to the judiciary,
therefore is not necessarily construed as it should be). See generally William J. Duensing,
EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co.: Choice of a Test for Coverage of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 64 B.U. L. REV. 1145, 1182-83 (1984) (stating the purpose of the ADEA
was "to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age" due
to the lack options available to older people); Chad A. Stewart, Comment, Young,
Talented, and Fired: The New Jersey Law Against Discriminationand the Right Decision
in Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1689, 1706 (noting that New
Jersey based its age discrimination law on the ADEA and incorporated its age restrictions
of 40 years old and above).
128 Cline, 296 F.3d at 476 (6th Cir. 2002) (Williams, J., dissenting).
129 See Cline, 296 F.3d at 467 (holding that there is a cause of action within the
ADEA for plaintiffs, forty or older, who have been discriminated against by their
employers who favor older employees). See generally Kyle C. Barrentine, Disparate
Impact and the ADEA A Means To An End or Justice?, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 1245, 1273
(1996) (discussing the coverage of the ADEA). But see Hamilton v. Caterpillar, 966 F.2d
1226, 1227-28 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the ADEA does not provide for reverse
discrimination cause of actions).
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It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of
its makers

. .

. If a literal construction of the words of a

statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as to
avoid the absurdity.130
In deciding whether a result is absurd, the courts look to
whether the result is contrary to common sense, as well as
"inconsistent with the clear intentions of the statute's drafters that is, whether the result is absurd when considered in the
particular statutory context."13 1
Permitting "reverse age discrimination" suits is not absurd.
The congressional intent of the ADEA was to prevent
discrimination on the basis of age. Allowing younger employees
within the ADEA's protected class to bring suit when their
employer discriminates against them in favor of older employees
is not an absurd result.
The concurring opinion in Cline aptly observed courts' current
trend of interpreting state discrimination laws as permitting
reverse age discrimination suits. 132 Further, the language of the
statute does not preclude these suits; there are no convincing
arguments that these suits are absurd in nature. Absent an
absurd result, the plain language of a statute should control. 133
The Hamilton opinion argued that it "would make little sense"
to limit the ADEA's protected class to those forty and above if it
truly intended to prevent reverse age discrimination.13 4 This is a
130 Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459-60 (1892).
131 Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1998). See Green v.
Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509 (1989) (finding court must look to additional
evidence as to congressional intent when "literally reading of a statutory term would
'compel an odd result"').
132 Cline, 296 F.3d at 474 (Cole, J. concurring) (clarifying that allowing reverse
discrimination claims is well within the purposes of the ADEA). See Zanni v. Medaphis
Physician Servs. Corp., 240 Mich. App. 472, 475-76 (Mich. 2000) (noting that
discrimination under the ADEA refers to chronological age and is not limited to older
people); Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 214-15 (1999) (explaining that
the N.J. LAD, the state equivalent of the ADEA, is broad enough for a reverse
discrimination claim).
133 See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985) (clarifying that the plain
language of a statue is controlling, and caution should be used when examining its
legislative history); Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 260 (1945) (asserting that the
legislative history can not overcome the plain language of a statute); Edwards v. Valdez,
789 F.2d 1477, 1481 (10th Cir. 1986) (stating that plain language of a statute should
control, absent an irrational result).
134 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227 (noting that if reverse discrimination claim were the
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faulty argument. The first problem is that no plaintiffs have
argued that the purpose of the ADEA is to prevent reverse age
discrimination, which is how the language in Hamilton presents
this situation. The plaintiffs all argue that the purpose of the
ADEA is to protect older employees from discrimination in the
workplace on the basis of their age. By setting the minimum age
of the protected class at forty, Congress indicated that it
considered workers forty and above to be "older," and therefore,
all workers forty and above are protected under its provinces.135
The Hamilton court was wrong: it makes perfect sense to set an
age cutoff for the ADEA's protections. 136 As the ADEA sets out to
protect older workers, the age cutoff simply defines which
workers are considered older (those forty and above). Therefore,
age boundaries are logical within the ADEA's protections.
B. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Interprets
the ADEA to Protect All Workers Within the Protected Class
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") is
vested with the primary authority to implement the ADEA.137 In
its frequently cited Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
intent of Congress they would not have limited the protected age group to forty and older);
see also Schuler v. Polaroid Corp., 848 F.2d 276, 278 (1st Cir. 1988) (discussing the
prohibitions of the ADEA as not including "treating older people more generously than
others"); Karlen v. City Colls. of Chi., 837 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 1988) (distinguishing the
ADEA protected class from Title VII, including that ADEA does not provide protection for
the young from the old).
135 See generally Roberta Sue Alexander, The Future of DisparateImpact Analysis for
Age Discrimination in a Post-Hazen Paper World, 25 DAYTON L. REV. 75, 78 (1999)
(explaining the process Congress developed in order to discern if age discrimination was
in need of statutory protection); Alison Barnes, The American With Disabilities Act:
Envisioning a Future for Age and Disability Discrimination, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
263, 269 (2001) (noting the protected class under the ADEA is forty years old or above);
Michael J. Van Sistine & Bruce Meredith, The Legality of Early Retirement Incentive
Plans: Can Quantum Physics Help Resolve the Current Uncertainty?, 84 MARQ. L. REV.
587, 618-19 (2001) (finding that Congress intended to protect older workers from age
discrimination when they enact the ADEA).
136 See O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996) (explaining
that the ADEA prohibits discrimination based on a person's age and Congress limited
that protection to forty and older). But see Woodruff, supra note 111, at 1299-1301
(asserting that the goal of the ADEA was to protect against arbitrary age discrimination
and that goal is not attained until the minimum age requirement of forty is dropped,
allowing all ages to be protected under the ADEA).
137 See Stevens v. Dep't of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1, 11 (1991) (Stevens, J. dissenting)
(commenting that EEOC is charged with interpretation of ADEA); Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 493-94 (1991) (explaining that the EEOC's interpretation of the ADEA is
given substantial weight); see also Kralman v. Ill. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 23 F.3d 150,
155 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the EEOC's duty to enforce the ADEA, so there is much
deference given to its interpretation).
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Defense Council138 opinion, the Supreme Court decided that great
deference should therefore be given to the EEOC's interpretation
of the ADEA. 139 The EEOC maintains that all workers within the
protected class are protected by the ADEA. The relevant EEOC
regulation states:
It is unlawful in situations where this Act applies, for an
employer to discriminate in hiring or in any other way by
giving preference because of age between individuals 40
and over. Thus, if two people apply for the same position,
and one is 42 and the other 52, the employer may not
lawfully turn down either one on the basis of age, but
must make such decision on the basis of some other
40
factor. 1

As the EEOC is granted with primary authority for
implementing the ADEA, its interpretation must be given great
consideration and deference. The EEOC has clearly interpreted
the ADEA to provide protection for anyone in the protected age
group.
In Hamilton, the Seventh Circuit summarily dismissed the
EEOC regulation, arguing that the regulation has only been cited
twice, in dissimilar circumstances.141 However, Hamilton fails to
138 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
139 Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). See Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (stating that administrative interpretation
of Act by agency responsible for enforcing it is entitled to "great deference."); Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) ("[w]hen faced with a problem of statutory construction,
this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or
agency charged with its administration."); Burzynski v. Cohen, 264 F.3d 611, 619 (6th Cir.
2001) (finding that EEOC's interpretation of ADEA is "significant because an agency's
interpretation of an ambiguous provision within the statute it is authorized to implement
is entitled to judicial deference"); Sims v. MacMillan, 22 F.3d 1059, 1060-61 (11th Cir.
1995) (stating "[t]he EEOC's interpretation of Title VII "need only be reasonable to
be entitled to deference.); EEOC v. Kloster Cruise, Inc., 888 F.Supp. 147, 150 (S.D.Fla.
1995) (citing Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc., 935 F.2d 322, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See, e.g.,
Wayne v. Vill. of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 527 (6th Cir. 1994) ("[iut is well-settled that, where
a government agency has administrative authority over a statute, we are obliged to accord
great deference to the agency's reasonable interpretation of that statute").
140 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (1991). Compare Hamilton v. Caterpillar, 966 F.2d 1226,
1227-28 (7th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing EEOC analysis by noting it has found only two
references to cited regulation, and both cases cite regulation for proposition that older
plaintiff may maintain cause of action under ADEA, even if his replacement is over forty
years old), with Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., 296 F.3d 466, 471 (6th Cir. 2002)
(finding EEOC interpretation to be "a true rendering of the language" of ADEA). See
generally Garrett v. Henderson, 1997 WL 574739 (EEOC 1997) (finding "the
Commission's regulation provides protection from age discrimination to both the older
and younger individuals who fall within the ambit of the ADEA."), aff'd, 1999 WL 909980
(EEOC 1999).
141 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228 (explaining the other interpretations of the regulation
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consider the language of the regulation. Regardless of whether
the regulation has been cited by federal courts or not, and in
what way, the regulation is clearly stated. The plain language
illustrates that the discrimination cuts both ways, and it would
be age discrimination for an employer to treat a 52-year old
better than a 42-year old.142 This EEOC regulation supports the
allowance of reverse discrimination suits under the ADEA.143 An
administrative agency's interpretation does not depend on
judicial approval for its validity.
The Supreme Court has held that the EEOC's interpretation of
the ADEA "need not have to be the best one by grammatical or
other standards."14 4 "Rather, the EEOC's interpretation of
ambiguous language need only be reasonable to be entitled to
deference."14 5 Further, the Eleventh Circuit has stated, "agency
interpretation [of a statute] is reasonable and controlling unless
6
it is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to a statute."14
Here, the EEOC's regulation is certainly reasonable, no
arguments have been offered as to why it would be unreasonable,
therefore, this regulation should be given deference. The EEOC
clearly interpreted the ADEA to encompass employment
discrimination against anyone within the protected class.
C. Analogous Interpretationsof Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
Support Allowing Reverse Age DiscriminationClaims

The Supreme Court has held that the ADEA and Title VII of

to mean that a person over forty may maintain a claim under the ADEA even if his
replacement is over forty). See La Montagne v. Am. Convenience Prods., 750 F.2d 1405,
1411 n.4 (7th Cir. 1984) (clarifying that the EEOC regulation prohibits an employer from
partaking in age discrimination "when he chooses among people in the protected class.");
Miller v. Lyng, 660 F. Supp. 1375, 1377 (D.C. 1987) (noting that "it is now hornbook law
that the ADEA covers 'discrimination based on age between younger and older persons
within the group protected by the Act."') (citation omitted).
142 Obviously, the reverse is age discrimination as well, but that is not the concern of
this paper.
143 See Cline, 296 F.3d. at 470 (holding EEOC's interpretation of ADEA allows
reverse discrimination suits). But see Dennard & Kelly, supra note 3, at 725 (noting
reverse age discrimination is not barred by the ADEA); Dorf, supra note 13, at 993
(stating lower courts have found ADEA does not bar reverse discrimination).
144 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 493 (1991) (quoting EEOC v. Comm. Office
Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988)).
145 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 493 (noting EEOC's analysis of ADEA and Title VII should
be treated identically).
146 Dawson v. Scott, 50 F.3d 884, 886 (11th Cir. 1995).
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the Civil Rights Act should be analyzed in the same fashion, 147 as
the ADEA's substantive provisions "were derived in haec verba
from Title VII."148 This is helpful when issues of proper
interpretation arise. Title VII explicitly recognizes claims of
reverse discrimination. Even though age and race are different
from each other, there is no reason the analysis of the two should
differ.
From a broader perspective, it is important to remember that
age discrimination is a comparatively unique form of
discrimination. Although discrimination on the basis of age and
race should receive the same analysis, age discrimination is
different. Age discrimination is unlike discrimination on the
basis of gender, race, or national origin,14 9 where the aggrieved
party is born with the particular attribute for which they claim
they are being discriminated against.150 Age is different because
a person's age is not an immutable characteristic. A person who
is older has not experienced lifelong discrimination as a woman
or a racial minority might. Age is something that, obviously,
comes to one later in life. A person is not born old; rather he or

147 See EEOC v. Fina Oil & Chem. Co., 835 F. Supp. 330, 332 n.1 (E.D.Tex. 1993)
(noting same analysis will be applied to ADEA as Title VII); see also EEOC v. Sperry
Corp., 852 F.2d 503, 507 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating courts adapted ADEA framework from
Title VII cases); Whitten v. Farmland Indus., 759 F.Supp. 1522, 1531 (D.Kan. 1991)
(positing analysis developed in Title VII cases used by courts for age discrimination).
148 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (quotingLorillard
v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)), which held that language of ADEA closely paralleled
that of Title VII). See Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001)
(observing sections in ADEA and Title VII are nearly identical).
149 Arguably, sexual preference discrimination can be grouped with gender, race and
national origin discrimination, as studies frequently indicate an individual is born
heterosexual or homosexual, and sexual preference is not a "choice." See John Crewdson,
Study on 'Gay Gene' Challenged, CHI. TRIB., June 25, 1995, at 1; Dean H. Hamer et al., A
Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation,
SCIENCE, July 16, 1993, at 321; Simon LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure
Between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, SCIENCE, Aug. 30, 1991, at 1034.
150 It is interesting to consider that the laws involved with these kinds of
discrimination. For instance, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects black as
well as white workers. See Machakos v. Meese, 647 F.Supp. 1253, 1262 (Dist. D.C. 1986)
(citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). Courts have
previously remarked "[I]t is well settled that Title VII affords protection to whites, as well
as minorities." Machakos, 647 F.Supp. at 1262. Also consider that women as well as men
are permitted to bring gender-discrimination actions. See Swage v. Inn Phila., 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8795, at *8 (E.D.Pa. 1996). State statutes prohibit discrimination based on
sexual orientation protect both homosexuals and heterosexuals. See DiBiase v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 727 (3d Cir. 1995). Can we therefore use these
arguments to analogize that younger workers (albeit younger workers within the
protected class) should be protected as well as older under the ADEA?
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she becomes old.151 Unlike most other forms of discrimination,
the victims of age discrimination have obviously not suffered its
effects their entire lives. Other authors have commented, "[a]ge
discrimination is a more subtle series of problems based upon a
52
combination of institutional factors and stereotyped thinking."1
Therefore, although discrimination based on an individual's
age may be different than discrimination based on race or
gender, there is no reason the statutory analysis should differ, as
ADEA's substantive provisions came straight from Title VII. The
analysis should not differ.
D. Interpretationof State Age DiscriminationStatutes to Allow
Reverse Age Discrimination
Decisions regarding state age discrimination statutes have no
binding effect on the issues of this discussion, which is concerned
with the federal law. However, rationale of courts interpreting
similarly worded state age discrimination statutes can be
instructive. It is important to note that the ADEA does not
preempt state age discrimination laws.15 3 Therefore, a state is
free to supplement ADEA's protection. As a general matter,
states tend to recognize reverse age discrimination claims.
In 1999, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Bergen
Commercial Bank v. Sisler15 4 permitted a twenty-five year old to
151 See Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age DiscriminationReally Age
Discrimination?:The ADEA's Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780, 786 (1997)
(finding that age discrimination "is seldom a matter of blind, arbitrary prejudice which
often exists for reasons of race, creed, color, national origin, or sex."); see also Barry
Bennett Kaufman, Preferential Hiring Policies For Older Workers Under The Age
DiscriminationIn Employment Act, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 825, 847 n.108 (1983) (noting age
discrimination different from traditional types of insidious discrimination); Sophie E.
Zdatny, Note, W. Va. Univ. v. Decher: The Futureof Age Discriminationin West Virginia,
98 W. VA. L. REV. 719, 725 (1996) (arguing age does not "define an insular and discrete
minority").
152 Issacharoff & Harris, supra note 151, at 786.
153 See Hulme v. Barrett, 449 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1989) (stating "the federal Act
does not preempt state age discrimination laws"); Adams v. Leatherbury, 388 So.2d 510,
513 (Ala. 1980) (noting the ADEA does not preempt state law); Maine Human Rts.
Comm'n. v. Kennebec Water Power Co., 468 A.2d 307, 310 (Me. 1983) ("ADEA does not
preempt state age discrimination in employment law").
154 157 N.J. 188 (1999). See Joy L. Lindo, Survey, Employment DiscriminationYouth-Based Termination - An Employee Age Discrimination Claim Based on Youth is
Cognizable under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination and Appropriately
Evaluated under a Heightened Reverse-Discrimination Standard - Bergen Commercial
Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 723 A.2d 944 (1999), 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 682, 683-84
(2000) (commenting on Bergen).
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bring an age discrimination claim under the New Jersey Law
Against Discrimination ("LAD").155 This law prohibits age
discrimination without identifying a specific age group as a
protected class. 15 6 Here, the plaintiff claimed he was wrongfully
terminated because he was perceived as too young for his
position as operator of merchant credit-card programs. 157
The Bergen court held that a plaintiff bears a heavy burden in
proving a reverse discrimination claim. 15 8 The court found that
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination, but
reconfigured the standard test, creating a "heightened 'reverse9
discrimination' formulation."15
The Michigan Civil Rights Act160 serves to protect workers who
155 N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 10:5-1 - 10:5:42 (2002). Section 10:5-4 provides that:
all persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment.., without
discrimination.., because of age .... subject only to conditions and
limitations applicable alike to all persons. This opportunity is recognized
as and declared to be a civil right." Section 10:5-12 states, "[iut shall be
unlawful employment practice, or ... unlawful discrimination ... for an
employer, because of the.., age ...of any individual... to refuse to hire
or employ or to bar or to discharge or require to retire ... from employment
such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of
employment.
Id.
See Lindo, supra note 154, at 682 (discussing the facts of the case); Stewart, supra note
127, at 1700-01 (analyzing underlying facts of the dispute).
156 See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-4 (2002) (stating discrimination based on "age" is
prohibited); Bergen Commercial Bank, 157 N.J. at 214 (holding statute is broad enough to
support a discrimination based in youth); Lindo, supra note 154, at 687 (noting a lack of
age limitation under LAD).
157 See Bergen Commercial Bank, 157 N.J. at 197 (noting plaintiff considered too
young to operate credit-card program); see also Lindo, supra note 155, at 682 (stating
plaintiff was terminated from credit-card program based on age); Stewart, supra note 127,
at 170 (addressing Sisler's termination from bank based on age).
158 See Bergen Commercial Bank, 157 N.J. at 211 (holding the employee bears the
burden of proof); see also Swider v. Ha-Lo Indus., 134 F.Supp.2d 607, 626 (D.N.J. 2001)
("the ultimate burden of proof remains on plaintiff to establish unlawful discrimination");
Lindo, supra note 155, at 687 (noting plaintiff must satisfy "reverse discrimination" test to
prevail).
159 Bergen Commercial Bank, 157 N.J. at 216-17. The new test required plaintiff to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that there were background
circumstances supporting the suspicion that the employer is the "unusual employer who
discriminates against the majority;" that the employee was performing at a level that
satisfied the employer's legitimate expectations; that regardless, he was fired; and he was
replaced with a candidate sufficiently older to permit an inference of age discrimination.
See Fuhrman, supra note 9, at 604-05. For an explanation on how the court arrived at the
standard, see Lindo, supra note 154, at 683-84.
160 M.C.L. § 37.2101 et seq. (establishing in section 101 that "[t]his act shall be known
and may be cited as the "Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act"); M.C.L. § 37.2101.10 (providing
that equal opportunity employment order "shall be implemented without discrimination
because of race, color, sex, handicap, religion, marital status, age or national origin"). See
Julie Badel, The Cutback That Cuts the Wrong Way: Older Workers Claim Disparate
Impact, Bus. L. TODAY, Mar./Apr. 2002, at 11 (discussing the scope of the Michigan
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are discriminated against on the basis of their age, whether it be
that they are discriminated against because they are too old or
too young. In Zanni v. Medaphis Physician Services,16 1 the Court
of Appeals of Michigan looked at the plain language of the
statute and found no basis to limit the protections of the section
to older workers. 16 2 The thirty-one year old plaintiff in Zanni had
been hired by defendant employer in 1985, later promoted to
account executive, and then terminated in 1996 after losing two
accounts1 6 3 and violating her employment plan.164 She was
replaced by a less qualified older female on or about the same
day.165 Prior to her termination, plaintiffs supervisor indicated
"her voice sounded too young on the phone and that the clients
66
wanted an older account executive."1

The Michigan statute provided that an employer should not
discriminate against an employee on the basis of age, and defined
age as "chronological age."1 67 The Zanni court held that the
statute).
161 240 Mich. App. 472, 477 (2000) (holding that the statute protects against age
discrimination). See Jennifer L. Reichert, Employee May Claim Age Bias For Being "Too
Young", TRIAL, July 2000, at 130 (highlighting the decision of the case as one allowing
workers to recover for age discrimination). See generally Christine M. Gimeno, State
Statutes: Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act: Employment: Prohibited Acts, 5 MICH. CiV.
JURISPRUDENCE § 39 (illustrating the application of the statute to age discrimination
claims).
162 Zanni v. Medaphis Physician Serv. Corp., 240 Mich. App. 472, 476 (Mich. Ct. App.
2000) ("the plain language of the statute provides no basis to limit the protections of § 202
to older workers"). See generally Susan K. DeClercq & Kimberly G. Musolf, Annual
Survey of Michigan Law, June 1, 1999 - May 31, 2000: Employment and Labor Law, 47
WAYNE L. REV. 529, 530-32 (2001) (commenting on labor and employment law issues);
Reichert, supra note 161 (discussing the holding of the case).
163 Plaintiff claimed that older account representatives who had lost two or more
accounts did not have their employment terminated for their actions. See Zanni, 240
Mich. App. at 474.
164 See Zanni, 240 Mich. App. at 474 (establishing that the defendant terminated
plaintiffs employment in 1996 "because she lost two accounts and had 'violated her
employee plan"'); Matusewitch, supra note 48 at 3 ("the company fired Zanni in 1996,
purportedly because she had lost two accounts and 'violated her employee plan"'). See
generally Janet M. Kyte, et al., Recent Developments From Around the States, 13 EMP. L.
STRATEGIST 6 (2000) (presenting the employment law decisions, including Zanni).
165 See Zanni, 240 Mich. App. at 474 ("a less qualified, older female replaced plaintiff
on or about the same day her employment was terminated"); Matusewitch, supra note 48
at 3 (providing that an older, less qualified person replaced Zanni).
166 Zanni, 240 Mich. App. at 474 (stating that plaintiffs supervisor told her that
plaintiffs voice sounded too young). See DeClercq & Musolf, supra note 162, at 530-31
(presenting plaintiffs testimony that her supervisor told her that her voice sounded too
young); Kyte, supra note 164 ("plaintiff was told by her supervisor that her voice sounded
too young").
167 M.C.L. § 37.2103 ("[a]ge" means chronological age except as otherwise provided by
law"). See Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Review of the Supreme Court'sEmployment Cases (19992000 Term) and Emerging Issues, ALI-ABA, July 17, 1997, at 1505 (2000) (commenting on
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statute's plain language did not provide a basis for limiting its
protection to older workers,1 68 and therefore,
[i]f an employer disfavors an employee because the employer
perceives the employee as being too young, the employer has
plainly disfavored that employee on the basis of the
employee's chronological age just as much as if the employer
1 69
disfavored the employee for being perceived as too old.
The Zanni court found that the statute "protect[s] workers who
were discriminated against on the basis of their youth."170 The
language of Michigan's statute is not identical to the ADEA, and
instead of limiting the protected class to persons over forty and
discussing "older workers," this statute is focused on
discrimination on the basis of "chronological age." However, the
rest of the language is not very different, yet the plain language
argument was held to be persuasive.
Similarly, the Maine Human Rights Act ("MHRA")171 does not
limit age discrimination to a certain specified range of ages. A
reduction in force at a paper mill led to Graffam v. Scott Paper
Co.,172 a suit brought by eleven former employees of the mill.
The plaintiffs, all of whom were at least fifty years old at the
time they were discharged, alleged age discrimination in

the anti-discrimination statute as prohibiting discrimination against "too young"). See
generally DeClercq & Musolf, supra note 162 (discussing the issue of employment
discrimination in Michigan).
168 Zanni, 240 Mich. App. at 476 ("the plain language of the statute provides no basis
to limit the protections of § 202 to older workers"). See Badel, supra note 160 (presenting
the problem of age discrimination and application of the statute designed to protect
against such discrimination); see also Matheson v. GMC, 2001 Mich. App. LEXIS 2083, at
*14, n. 15 (remarking the holding in Zanni).
169 Zanni, 240 Mich. App. at 476.
170 Zanni, 240 Mich. App. at 477.
171 5 M.R.S. §§ 4551-4633 (1989 & Supp. 1994) (prohibiting age discrimination). See
Developments In State Constitutional Law: 1999 II. Individual Rights, 31 RUTGERS L. J.
1094, 1115 (2000) (providing that unlawful discrimination in employment gives a cause of
action under Maine Civil Rights Act); see also Christopher Parr, Comment, The Maine
Civil Rights Act: History, Enforcement, Application, and Analysis, 53 ME. L. REV. 189, 244
n.7 (2001) (prohibiting discrimination based on age).
172 Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 870 F.Supp. 389, 405 (D.Me. 1994) (holding that
discharged employees did not present enough evidence for age discrimination); see Three
Federal Court Decisions Favor Employers, ME. EMP. L. LETTER, Sept. 1995 (exposing the
decision in the case as part of a general trend and its affirmance by the Circuit Court,
Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 60 F.3d 809 (1st Cir. 1995)). See generally Michael Delikat &
Rene Kathawala, Personalityand Aptitude Tests: A Good Idea for Employers?, N.Y.L.J.,
Dec. 29, 1997, at 1 (discussing the employers' right to use personality tests to determine
job-readiness, as it was used to terminate employees in Graffam).
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violation of the ADEA and the MHRA.173 Although not an issue
in this particular case, the district court noted that while the
ADEA only protects persons over forty, the MHRA does not limit
its protection to a particular age group.174
What can be garnered from this study of state courts
permitting reverse discrimination suits is that there are states
willing to allow younger plaintiffs to bring suits claiming they
are being discriminated against on the basis of their age and
older employees are receiving preferential treatment. However,
the fundamental difference here is the language of the statute.
Unlike the ADEA, many of these state statutes do not limit the
prospective plaintiffs to a certain age range.
Perhaps the
problem with the ADEA is that it imposes these limits. However,
that is fodder for an entirely different issue. The relevance of
studying these suits is that many state courts have held that
younger persons were illegally discriminated against on the basis
of age when older employees are treated better.
CONCLUSION

Discrimination against older employees in the workplace is a
pervasive problem in our society. Aging Americans are faced
with regular discrimination on the basis of their age in their
daily lives. This problem has been exacerbated in recent years,
as the "Baby Boomer" generation is beginning to reach
retirement age. The foregoing analysis indicates that courts
should interpret the ADEA to allow claims of reverse age
discrimination.
A careful analysis of the ADEA reveals that all persons within
its protected class should be permitted to bring a claim if they
173 Graffam, 870 F.Supp. at 391 (presenting the complaint as alleging violation of
both statutes). See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 167, at 1510 (1997) (indicating that
the court dismissed the plaintiffs allegations of statutory violations); Charles A. Shanor,
Recent Developments in Age Discrimination Litigation, CA01 ALI-ABA 309, 339 (1995)
(noting procedural posture and holding of the case).
174 Graffam, 870 F.Supp. at 405 n.27 ("[the] distinction in the federal and the Maine
age discrimination statutes is that the Maine statute does not limit its protection to a
particular age group ... All persons are covered by the MHRA, while only individuals
over age 40 are given federal protection"); see Age Discrimination:Maine Law Doesn't
Recognise Age Discrimination Claims Based on 'DisparateImpact, ME EMP. L. LETER,
July 1999 (commenting on the application of both statutes in the courts of Maine); Rudy
L. Sustaita, Bracing for the Second Boom: The Courts Prepare the ADEA for the Baby
Boomers, 13 FALL EXPERIENCE 10 (2002) (acknowledging that ADEA protects workers
who 40 years old or older).
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have been discriminated against in the workplace on the basis of
their age.
It is irrelevant whether the employee receiving
preferential treatment is younger or older than the employee
suffering discrimination, as long as the wronged employee is
within the ADEA's protected class. The plain language of the
statute protects all employees aged forty and above, and these
employees should be permitted to bring the claims. Allowing
claims of reverse discrimination is supported by the EEOC,
which is responsible for interpreting the Act. The EEOC has
expressly found that reverse age discrimination claims should be
permitted. Further, interpretation of Title VII helps clarify the
issue of how to properly interpret the ADEA.
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that courts
should permit reverse age discrimination suits to be brought
under the ADEA, assuming that the injured party is within the
protected class. Although some courts may look to what they
think Congress meant or should have said, that is not the
question here.
The question is simply one of statutory
interpretation. The plain language of the ADEA allows younger
employees within the protected class to file actions when they
have been discriminated against on the basis of their age. The
Sixth Circuit recognized this in deciding Cline v. General
Dynamics. However, the issue is far from settled. As the
Supreme Court has granted General Dynamics' petition for a
writ of certiorari,1 75 it will be interesting to see how the Supreme
Court interprets the ADEA and addresses this issue when it
hears Cline v. General Dynamics this fall.

175 Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 123 S.Ct. 1786 (2003).

